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STANDING IN THE SHADOW OF TAX 
EXCEPTIONALISM: EXPANDING ACCESS 
TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL 
AGENCY RULES 
LYNN D. LU* 
As the Supreme Court recently confirmed, regulation of behavior through the tax code is 
“nothing new.”  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596 
(2012).  From the individual mandate’s “shared responsibility payment” to the income-
tax deduction for charitable donations, tax provisions raise or lower the cost of particular 
conduct.  In doing so, tax rules, like all administrative rules, reflect normative values and 
protect important public interests.  Yet the need for swift and certain collection of revenue 
has historically excused tax regulation from general administrative law principles that 
promote government accountability in the implementation of federal mandates. 
This Article explores one critical instance in which tax exceptionalism swallowed the 
rule of government accountability to insulate much federal agency rulemaking from judicial 
oversight in all administrative arenas: constitutional standing doctrine.  Under current 
standing doctrine, a wide range of regulatory stakeholders lacks access to federal court 
review of agency rules that adversely affect their concrete interests.  Where such 
stakeholders are members of historically or politically marginalized populations, the lack 
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of access to judicial review exacerbates process defects that limit their participation in 
rulemaking decisions.  The result is an imbalance in regulatory influence between entities 
subject to the burdens of regulation and those who stand to benefit from the enforcement of 
regulatory mandates. 
This Article reexamines two central cases that restricted standing in the context of tax 
exemption for public charities under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code: 
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), a poor 
people’s challenge to an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rule eliminating the requirement 
that tax-exempt hospitals provide charity care; and Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 
(1984), a challenge by black families to an IRS rule facilitating white flight from 
desegregated public schools to segregated, tax-exempt private schools.  In both cases, the 
Supreme Court failed to treat tax administration as a full-fledged regulatory scheme that 
governs the behavior of regulated entities with consequences for a wide range of regulatory 
stakeholders.  The Court’s implicit embrace of tax exceptionalism in both cases facilitated 
its explicit invocation of the separation of powers to restrict standing in Allen v. Wright—
a rationale that now applies broadly to limit constitutional standing in all administrative 
contexts. 
Today, federal courts increasingly reject tax exceptionalism and recognize the need for 
judicial review in all administrative contexts to check arbitrary agency decisionmaking—
albeit under deferential standards that respect agency expertise.  See Mayo Found. for 
Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).  This Article 
concludes that the erosion of tax exceptionalism exposes additional cracks in standing 
doctrine’s already flawed foundation and lends further support for the expansion of federal 
court access to a wider range of regulatory stakeholders to challenge agency rules. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a pair of federal class-action lawsuits filed in the 1970s, private 
individuals sought to compel the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)1 to impose 
greater obligations on hospitals and schools as conditions of federal tax 
exemption for public charities under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC).  In Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon,2 
people unable to pay the costs of health care challenged an IRS decision to 
stop requiring tax-exempt hospitals to provide free medical treatment.3  In 
Allen v. Wright,4 black families seeking fully desegregated public schools 
 
 1. IRC § 7801(a) (2012) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to administer the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC).  The Secretary appoints the Commissioner of the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) pursuant to IRC § 7803 to supervise the IRS as a bureau of the 
Treasury Department.  The Treasury Secretary is authorized under IRC § 7805(a) to 
promulgate “all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the IRC.  However, 
because IRS attorneys play a role in drafting Treasury regulations as well as informal 
internal revenue guidance documents governing tax exemption for public charities, for 
convenience this Article refers solely to IRS decisionmaking.  
 2. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973) (raising an 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenge to revenue ruling as contrary to IRC 
§ 501(c)(3) and invalidly promulgated without notice-and-comment procedures), rev’d sub 
nom. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated, 426 U.S. 
26 (1976). 
 3. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (superseding Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 
202). 
 4. Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979) (challenging IRS regulation as 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
and IRC § 501(c)(3)), rev’d sub nom. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev’d sub 
nom. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).  
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contested IRS policies facilitating white flight to segregated, tax-exempt 
private schools.5  In each case, plaintiffs highlighted the IRS’s crucial role in 
regulating social institutions serving the public interest by setting the terms 
of eligibility for favorable federal tax status as mandated by federal law. 
By demanding changes to federal revenue rules that assertedly furthered 
economic and racial inequality, both sets of plaintiffs recognized IRS 
regulation of public charities to be a powerful tool for social justice reform.  
On the one hand, the plaintiffs faced an uphill battle simply by litigating a 
tax matter.  Justice Stewart wrote separately in Eastern Kentucky only to 
observe: “I cannot now imagine a case . . . where a person whose own tax 
liability was not affected ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax 
liability of someone else.”6  On the other hand, Justice Stewart’s 
characterization of the case as a third-party attempt to initiate an individual 
tax enforcement action misconstrued plaintiffs’ challenges to broadly 
applicable IRS rules governing important social institutions and implicating 
persistent social injustices.  The IRS, like other federal agencies, does more 
than make enforcement decisions in individual cases of noncompliance.  As 
the federal agency tasked with implementing the statutory tax-exemption 
scheme through its revenue-defining and border-drawing authority, the 
IRS also sets the rules that govern exempt public charities’ behavior and 
determines the minimum standards for compliance in the first place.7  
Viewed in this light, the plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky and Wright legitimately 
sought to hold federal revenue officials accountable for ongoing violations 
of duties and “norms imposed by federal law”8—including the IRC. 
When the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that both plaintiff classes 
lacked federal court standing to sue the IRS for redress of concrete, 
particularized injuries,9 the courthouse doors swung closed to a wide range 
of would-be litigants seeking judicial oversight of federal agency action.10  
 
 5. See Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834; see also Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587 
(superseding Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834). 
 6. E. Ky., 426 U.S. at 46 (Stewart, J., concurring) (allowing exception for “the First 
Amendment area”).  
 7. See Leslie Book, Increasing Participation in the Rulemaking Process, 135 TAX NOTES 765, 
767 (2012) (referring to the IRS’s “quasi-legislative role”).  
 8. Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 233, 250, 258 (1991). 
 9. Wright, 468 U.S. at 766; E. Ky., 426 U.S. at 44–45.  
 10. See, e.g., Karl S. Coplan, Ideological Plaintiffs, Administrative Lawmaking, Standing, and the 
Petition Clause, 61 ME. L. REV. 377, 379–81 (2009); Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: 
Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral Politics by Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code 
and Related Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 29 (2003); Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A 
Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1183–95 (2009). 
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While regulated entities—including taxpayers challenging their “own tax 
liability”11—remain entitled to judicial review of federal agency decisions 
imposing regulatory burdens, other stakeholders who may stand to benefit 
the most from regulatory safeguards—often members of historically 
subordinated or politically marginalized populations12—lack judicial 
recourse to hold federal agencies accountable for violations of constitutional 
or congressional mandates in effectuating a regulatory scheme’s intended 
protections.13 
The Supreme Court explicitly based its decisions on prudential concerns 
regarding plaintiffs’ status as outsiders to the agency’s regulatory 
relationship with tax-exempt public charities,14 which it later recast as 
constitutional concerns about court authority to intrude into executive 
affairs under the separation of powers.15  Yet the Court’s stated rationale 
obscures a deeper—and potentially more vulnerable—basis for restricting 
judicial review of agency action: tax exceptionalism,16 or the view that the 
enforcement of revenue collection excuses tax administration from general 
administrative law principles promoting accountability in agency 
decisionmaking.  First, the Court’s reasoning ignored the regulatory impact 
of tax rules on a wide range of regulatory stakeholders—impact that should 
justify access to judicial review of such rules.  The rejection of tax-
exemption administration as an effective regulatory scheme then freed the 
Court to resort to broad prudential and constitutional grounds to restrict 
standing in ways applicable to all administrative contexts. 
Constitutional standing doctrine thus rests in part on tax-exceptionalist 
foundations that are both hidden from view and unstable.  Federal courts 
increasingly recognize tax administration as regulation of behavior subject 
 
 11. E. Ky., 426 U.S. at 46 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
 12. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 742 
(1985) (describing the need for protection of “groups that are discrete and diffuse (like 
women), or anonymous and somewhat insular (like homosexuals), or both diffuse and 
anonymous (like the victims of poverty)”). 
 13. Additional barriers may also foreclose federal court review of action by state 
government officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Monaghan, supra note 8, at 256–57, or 
federal agency inaction, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An 
Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1675 (2004). 
 14. E. Ky., 426 U.S. at 42–43. 
 15. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984). 
 16. See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax 
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517 (1994) (identifying tax administration departures from general 
administrative law principles); Kristin E. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance 
or Deliberate Strategy?, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 89, 92–93, 111 (2010) (exploring reasons for 
lack of cross-pollination in administrative law through example of tax administration). 
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to general administrative law principles that promote both accountability 
and autonomy in federal agency action without offending the separation of 
powers.  While the current Court is unlikely to overrule Eastern Kentucky and 
Wright to permit broader standing for suits against agency officials by 
regulatory stakeholders alleging concrete, particularized injuries,17 it is 
nonetheless possible to reopen a vital discussion about how to expand 
access to judicial review of agency rules, as well as restore greater influence 
in administrative decisionmaking, to a wider range of regulatory 
stakeholders in public charities and other administrative contexts. 
This Article is divided into four parts.  Part I describes tax administration 
as a form of social regulation that deters and promotes particular behavior 
through the IRC.  Regulation of tax-exempt public charities offers one rich 
example of the importance of federal agency rules in promoting a diverse 
range of societal benefits, such as access to education and health care, to 
complement market-driven and governmental services.  Part I concludes by 
showing why poor people and people of color with a stake in the regulation 
of private hospitals and schools turned to the federal courts as a means of 
overseeing government agency decisionmaking affecting their interests. 
Part II describes the gatekeeping function of standing doctrine in limiting 
access to federal court to enjoin government agency action.  In particular, 
standing doctrine as developed in the tax-exemption context imposes 
obstacles to federal court access by regulatory stakeholders alleging 
constitutionally sufficient injuries.  Part II shows how the Court’s decisions 
in Eastern Kentucky and Wright implicitly reflect a tax-exceptionalist view of 
tax exemption for public charities that ignores the palpable coercive and 
incentive effects of broad, prospective revenue rules on the behavior and 
choices of tax-exempt public charities.  By characterizing tax 
administration as exclusively concerned with individual actions to enforce 
the collection of revenue, the Court could reject general administrative law 
principles supporting judicial review of agency action and instead resort to 
unduly broad prudential and constitutional rationales to deny standing.  As 
a result, standing doctrine illegitimately insulates the IRS—and, by 
extension, other federal agencies—from accountability for the harmful 
consequences of their rulemaking decisions. 
Part III argues that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Eastern Kentucky and 
Wright cannot be distinguished or limited in application as exceptional tax 
 
 17. See Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 
167 (2011) (“[O]ur only resort [for expanding standing] is in the Court: the hope of 
persuading a majority to expand the existing doctrine slightly at the margins and the 
possibility that future changes in personnel might make deeper revisions of the doctrine 
feasible.”).  
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cases.  While specific procedural rules promote administrative flexibility 
and efficiency in the collection and redistribution of revenue, tax 
administration also reflects public values and norms that, as in other 
administrative contexts, require protection of the interests of politically 
disempowered or historically marginalized stakeholders.  Federal courts 
increasingly recognize IRS regulation of taxpayer behavior as subject to 
general administrative law principles that maintain the separation of 
powers by ensuring agency accountability through judicial review while 
also according due respect to agency expertise on the merits—albeit in 
cases in which taxpayers challenging their own tax liability have clear 
standing.18  Part III argues that the demise of tax exceptionalism eliminates 
the only remaining explanation for the dubious reasoning of Eastern Kentucky 
and Wright.  Accordingly, there is room to relax standing for stakeholders 
alleging harm to concrete interests protected by federal regulatory schemes 
to seek judicial review of agency action in federal court in the tax context as 
in other administrative law contexts. 
This Article concludes by arguing that the changing landscape of tax 
administration warrants new consideration of the role of regulatory 
stakeholders in challenging federal agency action in federal court as one 
additional tool of government oversight, particularly in the context of 
public charities regulation.  Renewed attention to this issue may, at a 
minimum, enrich future discussions of broad stakeholder influence in tax 
administration and generate a fuller debate about whose interests matter in 
the regulation of tax-exempt public charities and beyond.  Such an 
outcome alone would amount to a partial vindication of the principles first 
advanced in Eastern Kentucky and Wright nearly forty years ago. 
I. TAX EXEMPTION FOR PUBLIC CHARITIES AS REGULATION 
A. Tax Administration as Regulation 
As the Supreme Court recently confirmed, regulation of behavior 
through the tax code is “nothing new.”19  By raising the cost of certain 
 
 18. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 
(2011) (rejecting tax exception to application of Chevron deference); Cohen v. United States, 
650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding the reviewability of the procedure for refunding 
tax proceeds despite tax-specific barriers). 
 19. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595–96 (2012) 
(upholding, as a permissible exercise of the congressional power to tax, an imposition of a 
“shared responsibility payment” on qualifying individuals who fail to purchase minimal 
health insurance coverage); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 962 (Cambridge, Metcalf & Co. 1833) (“[T]he taxing power is 
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activities through a tax—or, conversely, by lowering the cost through a tax 
exclusion—tax rules provide economic deterrents or incentives for behavior 
in much the same way as direct prohibitions or subsidies.  Stanley Surrey 
famously characterized tax exemptions, deductions, credits, and other “tax 
expenditures” that are “deliberate departures from accepted concepts of net 
income” as the functional equivalents of direct spending to promote 
particular behavior.20  More fundamentally, scholars have long recognized 
that all revenue rules reflect normative decisions and promote public values 
according to legislative design.  Even to define basic terms such as 
“income”21 subject to taxation—or “charitable” purposes that are not—
requires a determination of social values.  Indeed, “the basis on which we 
choose to raise revenue and the people from whom we choose to raise it 
reflects some conception of fairness and justice.”22 
Professor Sugin argues that it is appropriate that “[t]he tax law 
[generally] should be a tool for achieving substantive equality because it is 
powerful, its effects are widespread, and its medium is money, the root of so 
much social inequality.”23  Because tax administration allocates revenue 
among entities—for example, by encouraging transfers among taxpayers 
or, conversely, conservation of funds otherwise payable as tax—it operates 
like direct government spending and plays a key role in redistributing 
societal resources for the provision of public goods.24 
Social justice advocates historically have targeted a broad range of public 
finance mechanisms to ensure government accountability in the allocation 
of resources on behalf of the least politically and financially influential 
sectors of the public.  For example, in cases challenging government 
 
often, very often, applied for other purposes, than revenue.”); Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure 
Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 407, 472 (1999) (“[T]he tax law is not 
simply a revenue raising tool.”).  
 20. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 3 (1973); see also Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing 
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV 705, 706, 
711 (1970). 
 21. See Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 
NAT’L TAX J. 244, 250 (1969) (noting that the scope of a normative tax base from which the 
definition of “expenditures” derives depends on “debatable lines”); see also Sugin, supra note 
19, at 474 (arguing against “limiting the legal consequences of different tax provisions 
depending on their categorization as income-defining or not”). 
 22. Sugin, supra note 19, at 472.  
 23. Id. at 474. 
 24. See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 
1, 42 (2011) (“The most distinctive role for tax policy is in distributive justice, and tax 
expenditures are a crucial mechanism for achieving fairness in the allocation of government 
benefits and burdens among individuals.”). 
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funding for private religious activity, public interest litigants have enforced 
the Establishment Clause’s prohibition on the diversion of state aid to 
religion.25  In cases challenging state provision of resources to private actors 
who discriminated on the basis of race, litigants have similarly enforced the 
Equal Protection Clause’s command to government officials to “steer 
clear . . . of giving significant aid to institutions that practice racial or other 
invidious discrimination.”26  Broad conditions in federal spending 
legislation prohibit certain uses of federal funds by recipients in a range of 
contexts, from Title VI, which prohibits racial discrimination by any 
recipient of “federal financial assistance,”27 to the Rehabilitation Act28 and 
Title IX,29 which prohibit discrimination by recipients on the basis of 
disability and sex, respectively.  Accordingly, to the extent that tax 
exemption or deductions effectively amount to the provision of federal 
financial assistance to,30 if not state encouragement of, the policies and 
practices of private entities that violate federal norms, the IRS should 
likewise be accountable to the public. 
While tax exemptions or tax deductions share similarities with direct 
government spending programs, however, they differ in significant respects, 
particularly in the nature and degree of “joint public and private 
decisionmaking” involved and the level of autonomy granted to private 
actors in determining the activities in which to engage or invest.31  
Nonetheless, Professor Sugin points out, “[t]he creation of the legal regime 
itself—the statutes, regulations, and administrative practice[s]” governing 
taxpayer behavior—“is undeniably state action” subject to constitutional 
mandates, although “whether that action violates the substantive 
 
 25. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 609 (1971) (quoting district court 
opinions) (affirming injunctions prohibiting state school programs that “fostered ‘excessive 
entanglement’ between government and religion” and “had the impermissible effect of 
giving ‘significant aid to a religious enterprise’”).  But see Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 
U.S. 664 (1970) (holding that state property tax exemption for churches does not violate the 
Establishment Clause).  
 26. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 467 (1973) (enjoining a state provision of free 
textbooks to segregated private schools). 
 27. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (2006). 
 28.  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2012). 
 29. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (2012). 
 30. See, e.g., McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (recognition of tax 
exemption amounted to “federal financial assistance” subject to the antidiscrimination 
provisions as a condition of receipt).  But see EVELYN BRODY & JOHN TYLER, HOW PUBLIC IS 
PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY? SEPARATING REALITY FROM MYTH (2d ed. 2012) (rejecting 
characterization of tax exemptions and tax-deductible donations as government subsidies). 
 31. Sugin, supra note 19, at 433. 
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protections of the Constitution is a separate question.”32  Agency 
implementation of a legal regulatory regime, too, is undeniably government 
agency action subject to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) and other governing federal laws that promote transparency and 
fairness in federal regulation.  Such statutory mandates to protect the public 
interest in the regulation of private entities may well require more of federal 
agency officials than the Constitution.33  Indeed, by enacting broad 
statutory rights to seek judicial review of agency actions under the APA and 
other citizen-suit provisions, Congress has contemplated that “‘public 
interest’ litigants . . . would prod [an] agency to go further in implementing 
its statutory mandate.”34 
Federal regulation of tax-exempt public charities provides a particularly 
rich example of a regulatory scheme that invites such agency “prodding” 
because it requires determinations of what collective goods and services are 
of sufficient public value to merit favorable tax treatment.  As the site of 
contested value judgments with substantial social ramifications, public 
charities regulation also raises concerns about judicial authority to 
intervene in a sensitive regulatory arena.  IRS regulation of public charities 
thus implicates important questions regarding which public values should 
matter for purposes of tax exemption and, ultimately, for federal court 
intervention. 
B. Regulating Public Charities and Defining Public Benefit 
IRC § 501(c)(3) exempts from federal income and other taxes entities 
“organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, . . . educational,” or other enumerated purposes.35  So-called 
“public charities”36 play a vital role in the provision of public goods and 
 
 32. Id. at 434.  But see Linda Sugin, The Great and Mighty Tax Law: How the Roberts Court 
Has Reduced Constitutional Scrutiny of Taxes and Tax Expenditures, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 777, 795 
(2013) (showing how “tax expenditures . . . [have] become essentially unreviewable as a 
constitutional matter because the Court’s characterization denies the presence of any 
reviewable state action”). 
 33. See Sugin, supra note 19, at 474. 
 34. See Magill, supra note 10, at 1189–90 (discussing the rapid growth from 1965 to 
1970 of federal agencies and regulation that led to the rapid development of organizations 
devoted to impact litigation in the public interest). 
 35. See IRC § 501(c)(3) (2012); see also IRC § 170(c) (listing similar entities eligible for 
tax-deductible charitable contributions).  Public charities may qualify for additional 
exemptions under federal, state, or local law—such as low postage rates, state income or 
property tax exemption, or eligibility for private or government grants—either independent 
of or by virtue of their status as federally tax-exempt entities. 
 36. See IRC § 509(a) (distinguishing private foundations from other IRC § 501(c)(3) 
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encompass some of the most highly visible and influential institutions in 
society, including churches, universities, hospitals, social-service providers, 
and educational advocacy organizations of all stripes.  Federal tax-exempt 
status for public charities has been described as a federal “stamp of 
approval”37 bestowed on qualifying organizations, which hold coveted 
status as entities not only exempt from federal income taxation but also 
generally eligible to receive donations deductible from the taxable income 
of donors who itemize.38 
In 2009, the IRS recorded nearly one million exempt public charities 
collectively reporting over $1 trillion in revenue and expenses, as well as 
$2.5 trillion in assets.39  While the public benefits provided by such entities 
are difficult to quantify,40 observers generally credit the “independent” 
sector with providing particular public goods and services that market-
driven and governmental entities cannot or will not offer.41  Prohibited by 
 
entities colloquially called “public charities” based on diversity of funding sources); see also 
IRC § 507(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-1 (2012) (“Organizations which fall into the categories 
excluded from the definition of private foundation are generally those which either have broad 
public support or actively function in a supporting relationship to such organizations.”).  
Public charities are also distinguishable from social welfare organizations exempt under IRC 
§ 501(c)(4), which are not eligible to receive deductible donations (and are permitted to 
engage in insubstantial political-campaign activity as well as unlimited lobbying and 
voluntary disclosure of donors).  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2012) (“An 
organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare if it is primarily 
engaged in promoting . . . the common good and general welfare of the people of the 
community” and “civic betterments and social improvements.”).  Other entities are both 
exempt and eligible for deductible donations on very different grounds.  See IRC § 501. 
 37. See, e.g., Elizabeth MacDonald, Former White House Counsel to IRS: Pull Media Matters’ 
Tax-Exempt Status, FOX BUS. (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2011/ 
08/04/former-white-house-counsel-to-irs-yank-media-matters-tax-exempt-status/ (quoting 
complaint filed with the IRS by C. Boyden Gray, former White House counsel to President 
George H.W. Bush) (last visited Jan. 31, 2014); see also Sugin, supra note 19, at 452 (referring 
to placement of exempt organizations eligible for deductible donations “on the official and 
public list of approved organizations” in Publication 78, now superseded by an online 
database at Exempt Organizations Select Check, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-
Profits/Search-for-Charities).  
 38. See IRC § 170(c).  Stanley Surrey recognized the deduction as an “upside-down” 
subsidy that gives a greater tax break to taxpayers in higher income brackets.  Surrey, 
PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM, supra note 20, at 70.  
 39. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING 
TO THE FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS, JCX-55-111, 2 
(2011), available at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4371. 
 40. While economists have estimated the magnitude of the deduction scheme’s 
“subsidy” for charitable donations, projections of individual behavior are notoriously 
imprecise.  See Sugin, supra note 24, at 11. 
 41. “The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and 
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statute from distributing net profits to “any private shareholder or 
individual,”42 public charities may devote their resources to missions that 
government or investors of for-profit entities do not find to be politically or 
financially feasible to support, such as providing assistance to poor people 
ineligible for government benefits, supporting the arts, or engaging in 
advocacy of unpopular or even fringe viewpoints.  While public charities 
are restricted from engaging in “substantial” amounts of lobbying or 
“propaganda” and any level of political campaign activity,43 courts have 
recognized “the important role played by tax exemptions in encouraging 
diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints.”44 
Some consider the resulting variety of exempt public charities to be 
enriching to U.S. society;45 others view the range of exempt public charities 
as an embarrassment of “wildly diverse and indeed eccentric 
associations.”46  More significantly, critics charge that a combination of 
 
other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of 
revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by 
appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the 
general welfare.”  ROBERT L. DOUGHTON, THE REVENUE BILL OF 1938, H.R. REP. NO. 75-
1860, 19 (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 728, 742.  See Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, Respecting 
Foundation and Charity Autonomy: How Public is Private Philanthropy?, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 
571–72 (2010) (discussing justifications for government regulation of charities); Brian Galle, 
The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777, 781–82 (2012) (discussing 
limits of market and government failure theories); see also Rob Atkinson, Keeping Republics 
Republican, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 235, 235–36 (2011) (questioning whether nonprofits 
are always better qualified than government (or markets) to perform certain tasks for the 
public good).  
 42.  IRC § 501(c)(3) (exemption permitted only to entity “no part of the net earnings of 
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual”).  See Henry B. 
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 897 (1980) (discussing 
“nondistribution constraint”).  Professors Reiser and Rodrigues suggest that the 
nondistribution constraint alone operates as an internal governance mechanism that can 
focus priorities on the provision of public over private benefits.  See Dana Brakman Reiser, 
Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 63 (2011); Usha Rodrigues, Entity and 
Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1322 (2011).  
 43. IRC § 501(c)(3).  
 44. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983).   
 45. The independent sector may uniquely “facilitate[] democracy by providing a forum 
for free discussions and a proving ground for social innovation.”  Iris J. Goodwin, Donor 
Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 
1118 (2005).  
 46. ROB REICH ET AL., STANFORD UNIVERSITY CENTER ON PHILANTHROPY AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY, ANYTHING GOES: APPROVAL OF NONPROFIT STATUS BY THE IRS 2, 4 (draft report 
Oct. 25, 2009) available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/reichresearch/cgi-bin/site/wp-
content/uploads/2009/11/Anything-Goes-PACS-11-09.pdf (“Obtaining recognition by the 
IRS as a public charity is an embarrassingly easy thing to do.”). 
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loose standards and lax enforcement results in the IRS foregoing millions of 
dollars in uncollected revenue from possibly undeserving entities 
inappropriately recognized as tax-exempt public charities and their 
donors.47 
But collection of revenue is only one of the many purposes of tax 
administration; tax exemption for public charities may also promote 
democratic principles by permitting qualifying entities to play an important 
“mediating role between the individual and the state.”48  Crucially, to 
qualify for tax exemption, public charities must provide a benefit to a 
sufficiently broad class to serve a “public rather than a private interest.”49  
Professor Goodwin explains that public charities facilitate civil society by 
fostering the “pursuit of common ground and consensus” whereby “private 
interests stretch to encompass the interests of others.”50  It is therefore 
appropriate for public charities regulation to ensure that the use of 
charitable resources achieves collective rather than unshared gains. 
Historically, in the U.S., as under English law, certain categories of 
entities have enjoyed exemption from taxation based on their presumed 
provision of public benefits.  Lord Macnaghten’s 1891 decision in Pemsel’s 
Case famously designated four primary purposes of charitable trusts: “trusts 
for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for 
the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the 
community not falling under any of the preceding heads.”51  The federal 
tax-exemption statute for public charities—not limited to trusts—lists 
similar categories that have undergone little change in over a century.52 
 
 47. Id. at 3. 
 48. Goodwin, supra note 45, at 1118. 
 49. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (“An organization is not organized or operated 
exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified . . . unless it serves a public rather than 
a private interest.”).  See Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1065–67 (1989) 
(showing that organizations do not operate exclusively for exempt purposes within the 
meaning of § 501(c)(3) when more than an insubstantial part of its activities further non-
exempt purposes and, in turn, confer non-incidental private benefits).  
 50. Goodwin, supra note 45, at 1102–03, 1159 (observing “activity through extra-
political [voluntary, nongovernmental] associations” that “encourages activity that is purely 
political”) (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 517 (Penguin Books 
1956)). 
 51. Comm’rs v. Pemsel, [1891] UKHL 1, [1891] A.C. 531 (H.L.) 583 (appeal taken 
from Eng.); see also Statute of Charitable Uses Act, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (also known as the 
Charitable Uses Act or Statute of Elizabeth I). 
 52. Initially codified in the Tariff Act of 1894, the list of qualifying purposes has 
undergone little change.  Since 1913, the statutory-exemption language has taken 
substantially the form of the current exemption.  See Leslie Carol Bender, Note, Has the 
Supreme Court Laid Fertile Ground for Invalidating the Regulatory Interpretation of Internal Revenue Code 
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Congress has left to the Treasury and IRS the task of further fleshing out 
the substantive meaning and scope of “religious, charitable, . . . or 
educational” purposes eligible for the public charities exemption.53  
Although “relief of poverty” is not explicitly included among the 
enumerated categories in IRC § 501(c)(3),54 its implementing regulation lists 
“relief of the poor and distressed” as one possible purpose eligible for 
exemption, along with advancement of “human and civil rights secured by 
law,” “lessen[ing of] neighborhood tensions,” and other purposes.55  
Beyond these general and categorical pronouncements, the IRS has done 
little to announce minimum requirements that all public charities must 
exhibit.56 
Indeed, the role of the federal agency tasked with administering tax 
exemption for public charities is characterized by minimal oversight of a 
highly autonomous and influential social sphere.57  The public charities 
exemption scheme thus accommodates a wide range of interests, including 
the agency’s own needs for flexibility and ease of administration, as well as 
the needs of public charities and their donors for autonomy and 
predictability in structuring their conduct to comply with agency rules.  In 
particular, sensitivity to First Amendment principles supporting equitable 
treatment of all viewpoints may counsel particular caution in implementing 
restrictions on advocacy by public charities. 
What may not be fully accounted for in the existing scheme, however, 
are the interests of a broad spectrum of other stakeholders affected by the 
 
Section 501(c)(3)?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 564, 569 n.29 (1983) (collecting statutes). 
 53. IRC § 501(c)(3).  Professor Colinvaux argues that Congress has consistently relied 
on the existing tax-exemption standard to continue “passively accommodat[ing] significant 
growth of the charitable sector without demanding any rigor of the sector in the form of 
positive requirements or quantitative measures.”  Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: 
Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 7–8 (2011).  
 54.  In 1969, a House Report relying on charitable trust law explained that exempt 
public charities are statutorily permitted to carry out a broad range of purposes not limited 
to “the ordinary and popular sense” of the word “charity.”  See Paul Valentine, A Lay Word 
for a Legal Term: How the Popular Definition of Charity Has Muddled the Perception of the Charitable 
Deduction, 89 NEB. L. REV. 997, 1005 (2011).  Today, “[t]he term charitable is used . . . in its 
generally accepted legal sense” to permit purposes “as developed by judicial decisions.”  
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2). 
 55. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2).  
 56. Specific rules may apply to particular kinds of public charities.  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 
75-198, 1975-1 C.B. 157 (senior citizen center); Rev. Rul. 79-17, 1979-1 C.B. 193 (hospice); 
Rev. Rul. 75-472, 1975-2 C.B. 208 (substance abuse halfway house). 
 57. See Colinvaux, supra note 53, at 14.  At the very least, Professor Colinvaux notes 
that the public charities regulatory regime is marked primarily by negative rather than 
positive regulation.  
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public charities regulatory scheme.  Such stakeholders may harbor diverse 
motives for overseeing revenue rules, ranging from the self-interested to the 
civic-minded: some members of the general public may wish to 
micromanage the public fisc by eliminating “tax leniency” towards public 
charities engaged in particular activities, potential donors may wish to 
ensure the appropriate use of their charitable gifts, and other public 
charities may seek to level the playing field of competition for deductible 
donations or other forms of support.58  The intended beneficiaries of public 
charities also have concrete interests that warrant central consideration in 
the implementation of tax-exemption rules.  As clarified by Treasury 
regulation, such beneficiaries include, among others, “the poor and 
distressed or . . . the underprivileged,” residents in need of “lessen[ing of] 
neighborhood tensions,” and those in need of vindication of “human and 
civil rights secured by law.”59  As populations whose needs may not be fully 
met by the majority-controlled governmental or market-driven private 
sectors, those residents are particularly likely to comprise members of 
historically underrepresented or marginalized groups lacking the expertise, 
financial resources, and political power to influence agency decisionmaking. 
Sound reasons, however, may exist to curb private individuals’ efforts to 
steer IRS enforcement action against particular public charities; such 
limitations may preserve the prosecutorial discretion of the IRS while 
reducing vindictive scapegoating of unpopular organizations.60  Where 
regulatory stakeholders instead challenge the substance of broadly 
applicable rules, they seek to ensure that the agency is in fact exercising its 
enforcement discretion rather than misinterpreting its federal obligations.61  
Rather than usurping the IRS’s role as rule-enforcer,62 they seek to hold the 
IRS accountable in its independent role as rulemaker tasked with fully 
implementing protections mandated by federal law. 
When the IRS brings its own individual enforcement actions against 
 
 58. See, e.g., In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1021, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(denying “competitive advocate” standing to an organization alleging discriminatory 
enforcement of tax-exemption rules prohibiting political campaign activity). 
 59. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2012). 
 60. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 781, 783–84, 807–08, 814–19 (2009); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing 
Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 201, 234 (2000) (identifying concern 
that citizen enforcement will result in “zealousness error” and raising concern that reliance 
on citizen-informants may increase civic participation at the cost of violating anti-snitching 
norms).  
 61. See Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and 
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 636 (1999). 
 62. Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 (2011). 
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particular public charities, it effectively establishes standards applicable in 
future cases, but only indirectly and on a piecemeal basis.  In setting such 
enforcement standards, the agency still may not fully represent the interests 
of regulatory stakeholders who challenge the agency’s own interpretation of 
its federal obligations.  In the only Supreme Court decision to explore the 
boundaries of permissible exempt purposes under IRC § 501(c)(3), Bob Jones 
University v. United States, the Court upheld the IRS’s revocation of tax-
exempt status from private religious schools with racially discriminatory 
admissions policies against a constitutional challenge under the Free 
Exercise Clause.63  In doing so, the Court interpreted § 501(c)(3) as 
incorporating charitable trust law doctrine to preclude exemption for any 
purpose—whether religious, educational, or otherwise charitable—that 
contravenes “fundamental public policy” as expressed by the Legislative, 
Judicial, and Executive Branches; in the case of Bob Jones, the public policy 
against discrimination on the basis of race.64  Ironically, the public policy 
ground upheld by the Supreme Court in Bob Jones itself originated in Green 
v. Connally, the precursor to Wright, which arose not as an IRS enforcement 
action but a class action lawsuit by black families of Mississippi public 
schoolchildren who challenged IRS rules permitting tax exemption for 
private schools with racially discriminatory policies.65  When the 
nationwide class of plaintiffs in Wright later sought to expand the 
prohibition on tax exemption to private schools that remained racially 
segregated despite their adoption of nondiscrimination policies, they failed 
for lack of standing.66  In practice, then, even the Agency’s own view of 
fundamental public policy may fail to fully protect important stakeholder 
interests under either federal statutes or the Constitution. 
The recognition of racial nondiscrimination as a fundamental public 
policy in Bob Jones establishes a minimum standard for public benefits and 
values that merit tax exemption for public charities.  Yet the Court’s strict 
test for demonstrating fundamental national public policy ensures that only 
those policies receiving sufficient popular support for adoption by each 
branch of the federal government may qualify.  Such a high bar is well out 
of reach for most policies not supported by powerful political 
 
 63. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 603–05 (1983). 
 64. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 594; see Olati C. Johnson, The Story of Bob Jones 
University v. United States: Race, Religion, and Congress’ Extraordinary Acquiescence (Columbia 
Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 10-229). 
 65. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (D.D.C. 1971), summarily aff’d sub nom., 
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (mem.) (standing argument raised on appeal but not 
decided). 
 66. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755–56, 766 (1984). 
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constituencies.  Most importantly, without standing to seek judicial review 
of agency action, regulatory stakeholders cannot advance public policy 
arguments before one of the federal branches of government.  Ultimately, 
in the absence of standing for regulatory beneficiaries and other affected 
stakeholders to challenge agency decisionmaking, judicial-branch 
determinations of national public policy questions bearing on public 
charities exemption—for example, whether all exempt public charities must 
provide “relief of the poor” or any other minimum benefit—are unlikely to 
develop outside the rare IRS enforcement action. 
Judicial review of agency rulemaking provides a much-needed check on 
agency discretion and arbitrary decisionmaking.67  Under current standing 
doctrine, however, only certain regulatory stakeholders may seek judicial 
scrutiny of agency decisions that affect their concrete interests.  The lack of 
standing for all regulatory stakeholders to challenge agency action 
exacerbates existing risks of agency capture by regulated entities that alone 
wield the threat of judicial review.68  For sectors of the public who lack the 
political power to influence the rulemaking process,69 access to judicial 
review may provide the only means for effective and meaningful oversight 
of agency regulation on important matters in which they have a direct 
stake.70  Yet many regulatory stakeholders—particularly members of 
 
 67. See generally Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code 
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 269–70 (2009) (identifying the potential need to 
rein in IRS discretion in the issuance of informal guidance documents). 
 68. Agencies threatened with judicial review of regulatory decisions may more readily 
capitulate to the interests of regulated entities than to other stakeholders who cannot activate 
the court’s oversight authority.  See Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When 
Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L. J. 551, 561–62 (2012) 
(discussing risks of agency capture “by regulated industry” where “standing doctrine makes 
it harder for regulatory beneficiaries to get into court,” leading “agencies [to] try to please 
those who can sue: the regulated industry”); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: 
Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010) (describing process 
of agency capture through which “well-financed and politically influential special interests” 
outweigh “the diffuse interest of the general public” in agency decisionmaking).  
 69. See Thomas F. Field, Who Needs the Public Interest Movement?, 27 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 
415, 436 (1975) (describing challenges faced by members of the general public in exerting 
the necessary power to influence the tax rulemaking process); see also Book, supra note 7, at 
771 (“Some taxpayers may not have the resources or expertise to participate in the process, 
and even if they did, the IRS may not be attuned to weigh those interests properly.”).  
 70. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1842 (2001) (supporting broader access to judicial review to 
“encourag[e] self-governance and public participation” and “filter[] faction-dominated 
policymaking,” among other reasons); see also Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State 
Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1173–74 (1999) 
(supporting judicial review by state courts to allow marginalized groups, such as the poor, 
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historically or politically marginalized social groups—face substantial limits 
in their ability to play a role of consequence in IRS decisionmaking that 
affects their interests.71  These concerns are amply illustrated by IRS 
regulation of private hospitals and schools as tax-exempt public charities 
that led to the legal challenges in Eastern Kentucky and Wright. 
C. The Examples of Health Care and Education in Public Charities Regulation 
Soon after the codification of the current version of § 501(c)(3) in the 
IRC in 1954, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 56-185 clarifying that, to 
qualify for exemption, health facilities must operate “to the extent of [their] 
financial ability for those not able to pay for the services rendered and not 
exclusively for those who are able and expected to pay.”72  The ruling 
reflected the status quo, as the IRS and reviewing courts had for decades 
directed hospitals to provide relief to the poor as a condition of tax 
exemption. 
In the early 1960s, while Congress considered legislation that would 
become the Medicare and Medicaid Act, hospital lobbyists anticipating a 
future in which everyone had the means to pay for health care reportedly 
pressed the IRS for new rules eliminating the “charity care” requirement 
for tax exemption.73  By 1965, Congress had passed the Medicare and 
Medicaid Act to provide financial coverage for qualifying elderly, disabled, 
and low-income individuals to pay health costs.  Although financial 
 
“to leverage legal activity into political power,” “change political discourse,” and otherwise 
“facilitate[] productive political activity”); see generally Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, 
State Courts and Constitutional Socio-Economic Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN. 
ST. L. REV. 923, 937 (2011) (criticizing lack of court access to enforce socioeconomic rights 
where “those whose interests are most at stake . . . (typically people of limited means) lack 
equal or meaningful access to democratic processes”). 
 71. See Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy 
Statements, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 530 (1977) (criticizing federal agencies’ “exclu[sion of] the 
interested and affected public from participation in the formulation of interpretations and 
policy,” including informal IRS guidance documents); Field, supra note 69, at 428 (“The 
general public, although invited to testify, simply has no one to represent them . . . .[making 
it] difficult for fair-minded administrators to balance the needs of the public and of the 
affected special interests.”); see also Ira L. Tannenbaum, Public Interest Tax Litigation Challenging 
Substantive IRS Decisions, 27 NAT’L TAX J. 373, 379–80 (1974) (describing the importance of 
public interest tax litigation). 
 72. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202–03. 
 73. They also sought categorical exemption for entities engaged in the promotion of 
health.  See Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: 
Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 320 (1991) (describing “the 
hospital industry’s complaint that . . . public programs had greatly reduced the demand for 
charity care and rendered the existing standard for exemption an anachronism”). 
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coverage was far from universal, in 1969, the IRS promulgated Revenue 
Ruling 69-545, explicitly modifying Revenue Ruling 56-185 “to remove 
therefrom the requirements relating to caring for patients without charge or 
at rates below cost.”74  Instead of providing a minimum level of charity care 
for the poor, hospitals could now demonstrate “charitable” purposes by 
meeting a broader “community benefit” standard.  For example, hospitals 
could provide only emergency assistance to the poor and still provide a 
community benefit solely by “maintain[ing] an open medical staff” and 
resting “control of the hospital . . . with [a] board of trustees . . . composed 
of independent civic leaders.”75 
Soon after the issuance of Revenue Ruling 69-545, poor people denied 
health care by tax-exempt hospitals for inability to pay turned to poverty 
lawyers who had already been litigating similar health care access issues 
under the Hill-Burton Act, which conditioned the receipt of federal funds 
for new hospital construction on the provision of a “reasonable volume” of 
uncompensated care.76  Filed in 1971, Eastern Kentucky presented an APA-
based challenge to the new policy set forth by Revenue Ruling 69-545, both 
as substantively invalid under § 501(c)(3)’s “charitable” standard for failing 
to require relief for the poor and as procedurally invalid because the policy 
was promulgated without notice-and-comment rulemaking.77 
Meanwhile, civil rights activists had already begun to challenge tax-
exemption rules permitting racially segregated private schools as part of the 
battle to desegregate public school districts.78  As historians have extensively 
 
 74. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 119.  
 75. Id. at 118.  Since 1986, the Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act 
(EMTALA) has required all hospitals participating in Medicare to provide emergency 
assistance to anyone regardless of ability to pay.  See generally SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., LAW 
AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 1020–1107 (2012) (describing protections under 
EMTALA). 
 76. See generally Marilyn G. Rose, The Internal Revenue Service’s “Contribution” to the Health 
Problems of the Poor, 21 CATH. U. L. REV. 35, 37 (1971) (describing harmful consequences of 
IRS tax-exemption policies on provision of health care to the indigent); Marilyn G. Rose, 
The Implications of the Charitable Deduction and Exemption Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code Upon 
the Service Required of a Voluntary Hospital to Treat the Poor, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 183, 183 
(1970) (same). 
 77. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1976).  
 78. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 961, 970–71 (4th Cir. 
1963) (invalidating the Hill-Burton Act’s separate-but-equal-facility provision because 
federally funded recipient hospitals are state actors subject to the Equal Protection Clause), 
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); see also Public Health Service Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
443 § 603(e), 78 Stat. 447, 451 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (2006)) (enacting 
prohibitions on separate-but-equal hospital facilities as conditions of federal funding).  But see 
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) (“That programs undertaken by the State 
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documented, after the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education,79 school districts in the South engaged in “massive resistance” to 
avoid desegregating their school systems.80  As white families seeking 
segregated educational environments across the country increasingly turned 
to schools funded through private, tax-deductible donations and exempt 
from taxation, these schools necessarily diluted the power of court 
desegregation orders to integrate public schools.81 
In 1970, in Green v. Connally,82 a class of black parents in Mississippi, 
which fell under a federal court desegregation order, successfully enjoined 
the IRS “from approving tax-exempt status for any school in Mississippi 
that did not publicly maintain a policy of nondiscrimination.”83  In issuing a 
preliminary injunction, the three-judge district court in Green relied heavily 
on evidence introduced in an earlier school-desegregation case that 
demonstrated the detrimental effect of segregated private schools on public 
school desegregation.84  In particular, the court noted the stigmatizing effect 
of ongoing private school segregation as well as the role of tax-exempt 
status as a form of federal encouragement of racial segregation.85  The IRS 
complied with the preliminary injunction by issuing new revenue rulings 
requiring all tax-exempt schools nationwide to adopt, certify, and publish a 
nondiscrimination policy.86 
 
result in substantial funding of the activities of a private entity is no more persuasive than the 
fact of regulation of such an entity in demonstrating that the State is responsible for 
decisions made by the entity in the course of its business.”).  
 79. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 80. Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 221–26 (1964) 
(observing that Prince Edward County in Virginia responded by closing its public schools to 
all students and instead funneling public funds to private schools reserved for white 
students).  
 81. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 635, 637–38 n.16 (1985) (describing the adverse impact of segregated private schools 
on the effort to desegregate public schools and noting that at one time Prince Edward 
County had sixty-four white students in public school, while 1,311 were enrolled in private 
schools). 
 82. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1179 (D.D.C. 1971), summarily aff’d sub nom., 
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). 
 83. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 578–79 (1983) (discussing Green).  
The court further ordered the IRS to require all schools to adopt and certify a 
nondiscrimination policy for admissions and school-related programs as a condition of 
exemption.  See Green, 330 F. Supp. at 1179. 
 84. Green, 330 F. Supp. at 1178. 
 85. See id. at 1162, 1178–79. 
 86. See Rev. Proc. 72-54 § 1, 1972-2 C.B. 834 (setting forth “guidelines for determining 
whether . . . [tax-exempt] private schools . . . have adequately publicized their racially 
nondiscriminatory policies as to students”); Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587 (superseding 
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The plaintiffs in Wright, this time a nationwide class of black parents of 
public schoolchildren, followed Green and filed suit challenging the existing 
IRS policies as insufficient to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, 
and § 501(c)(3), although they raised no APA claim.  In particular, the 
Wright plaintiffs requested that the IRS prohibit tax exemption for schools 
that “‘have insubstantial or nonexistent minority enrollments, which are 
located in or serve desegregating public school districts, and which . . . 
cannot demonstrate that they do not provide racially segregated 
educational opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in 
desegregating public school systems’”—regardless of whether they had 
adopted policies of nondiscrimination.87  Whether § 501(c)(3) may be 
interpreted to require such a condition of tax exemption for public 
charities—or any other conditions—remains unsettled, however.  In its 
1984 Term, the Supreme Court dismissed Wright for lack of standing, 
foreclosing judicial review of agency action by regulatory stakeholders not 
themselves subject to the rules they challenge.88 
Today, Professor Johnson concludes, “as the era of formal explicit, 
[school] segregation recedes, the IRS’s exemption policy is likely of little 
contemporary relevance.”89  Yet the battle to end racial segregation in 
education continues.  Civil rights advocates confirm that public schools 
continue to be racially segregated at levels matching those of the 
desegregation era,90 while affirmative action plans that seek to redress such 
disparities remain open to attack in the federal courts.91 
 
Rev. Proc. 72-54 and setting forth “guidelines and recordkeeping requirements for 
determining whether [tax-exempt] private schools . . . have racially nondiscriminatory 
policies as to students”). 
 87. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 747 (1984) (quoting plaintiffs’ complaint); see also 
Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968) (invalidating 
purportedly non-discriminatory school board plan that “remains a dual system” and fails to 
actually “effectuate conversion . . . to a unitary, nonracial system”). 
 88. The district court granted further relief to the Mississippi class in Green, Green v. 
Miller, No. 1355-69 (D.D.C. May 5, 1980) (amended June 2, 1980), but dismissed the Wright 
complaint in 1979 for lack of standing and because it held that Congress had evinced its 
intent to preclude the relief plaintiffs sought, Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 
1979).  In 1981, the D.C. Circuit reversed Wright and remanded.  Wright v. Regan, 656 
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 89. See Johnson, supra note 64, at 158. 
 90. See Robert A. Garda, Jr., The White Interest in School Integration, 63 FLA. L. REV. 599, 
614–15 (2011) (listing statistics indicating increasing racial segregation in recent decades); see 
also Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Fulfilling Brown’s Legacy: Bearing the Costs of Realizing Equality, 
44 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 6–7 (2004) (calling “resegregation in public education . . . an 
accelerating national tragedy”). 
 91. See Christian B. Sundquist, The First Principles of Standing: Privilege, System Justification, 
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In the health care context, the range of people unable to afford medical 
services will remain broad even under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act’s (PPACA’s) expansion of individual and Medicaid 
coverage,92 while dollars spent by tax-exempt hospitals on charity care 
remain minimal.93  Under PPACA, Congress has imposed new obligations 
as conditions of tax exemption for hospitals.94  Just as tax-exempt private 
schools must adopt and report details of their nonracially discriminatory 
admissions policies and programs,95 tax-exempt private hospitals must now 
adopt and report details of their financial assistance policies and procedures 
for periodically assessing and meeting community health needs.96  
However, just as the IRS does not require tax-exempt private schools to 
actually demonstrate that they are racially desegregated, the agency has not 
proposed any minimum requirement for the level of financial assistance or 
community health services that hospitals must provide in order to qualify 
for tax-exempt status.97  As one anti-poverty advocacy organization 
 
and the Predictable Incoherence of Article III, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 119, 160 (2011) (observing 
that the Supreme Court “denies standing routinely in cases advancing the rights of non-
white plaintiffs” while “strain[ing] to locate ‘injuries’ in cases involving the racialized claims 
of white plaintiffs, even when such claims would seem to be insufficient for Article III review 
under prior case law”).  
 92. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2704, 124 Stat. 
119, 154–55 (2010). 
 93. See Colinvaux, supra note 53, at 34–35 (discussing the ongoing indigent health care 
crisis); see also Bobby A. Courtney, Hospital Tax-Exemption and the Community Benefit Standard: 
Considerations for Future Policymaking, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 365, 366–67 (2011) (noting that 
more than 50 million uninsured U.S. citizens depend on charity care provided by hospitals 
that are usually nonprofit, private, and tax-exempt, while payments from insured or direct-
pay patients increasingly cannot subsidize charity care). 
 94. IRC § 501(r) (added by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, § 9007(a), 124 Stat. 119, 855 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010)).  
 95. IRS Form 990, OMB No. 1545-0047.  
 96. See Colinvaux, supra note 53, at 51. 
 97. See Community Health Needs Assessments for Charitable Hospitals, 78 Fed. Reg. 
20,523 (Apr. 5, 2013) (inviting public comment on proposed regulations regarding 
community health needs assessments and responding to informal comments previously 
invited by IRS Notice 2011-52, I.R.B. 2011-30 “Notice and Request for Comments 
Regarding the Community Health Needs Assessment Requirements for Tax-Exempt 
Hospitals”); id. at 20,525 (preserving “hospital facilities’ flexibility to determine the best way 
to identify and meet the particular health needs of the specific communities they serve”); 
Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 Fed. Reg. 38,148, 38,149 (June 26, 
2012) (inviting public comment on proposed regulations regarding financial assistance 
policies and responding to informal comments previously invited by IRS Notice 2010-39, 
I.R.B. 2010-24 “Request for Comments Regarding Additional Requirements for Tax-
Exempt Hospitals”), amended by 77 Fed. Reg. 47787 (Aug. 10, 2012); id. at 38149 (“Neither 
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observed in informal comments to the IRS, “neither the Act nor the 
proposed regulations supply the Secretary with much guidance as to what 
hospital actions will satisfy the law.”98  Accordingly, “the proposed 
regulations leave too much room for hospitals to follow their own 
prerogatives rather than those of the community.”99 
Lack of access to hospital care for the poor and racial segregation in 
education are only two examples of how public charities’ regulation may 
affect a broad range of stakeholders effectively excluded from the 
rulemaking process.  The lack of standing for such regulatory stakeholders 
to challenge IRS rules in federal court compounds their limited influence in 
agency decisionmaking, particularly where they may already lack financial, 
political, informational, or other resources to adequately air their 
interests.100  Judicial review thus remains a crucial mechanism for 
adjudicating agency obligations to implement the public policies and values 
protected under federal regulatory schemes. 
II. REGULATION OF TAX-EXEMPT PUBLIC CHARITIES 
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF STANDING 
TO CHALLENGE FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION 
A. Standing Doctrine and the Limits of Federal Court Authority 
Standing doctrine has played a crucial role in restricting parties’ access 
to federal court to seek judicial review of government agency action and to 
enjoin violations of federal law.  Early modern cases identified the purpose 
of assigning “the judicial Power” to enumerated federal “Cases” and 
 
the statute nor these proposed regulations establish specific eligibility criteria that a [financial 
assistance policy] must contain.”). 
 98. Letter from Gary A. Benjamin, Anti-Poverty Advocates, Mich. Legal Serv., to 
Internal Revenue Service (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.sitemason.com/files/ 
kWrQic/Michigan%20Legal%20Services%20Gary%20Benjamin.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 
2014). 
 99. Id.; see also Mary Crossley, Tax-Exempt Hospitals, Community Health Needs and Addressing 
Disparities, 55 HOW. L.J. 687, 701–02 (2012) (“[W]ithout meaningful prodding by the IRS, 
most hospitals may be unlikely to do more than the bare minimum identified as needed to 
satisfy the new requirement,” and “[a] real risk exists . . . that many hospitals . . . will . . . 
view the [community health needs assessment] requirement simply as a new hoop to jump 
through with the least possible effort expended.”).  
 100. Regulated entities may have greater financial, informational, and political resources 
than other stakeholders.  See Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-
Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1357–58 (2011); Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, 
Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2010) (discussing interest-group 
communications with agency decisionmakers prior to notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
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“Controversies” under Article III of the Constitution101 as “assur[ing] that 
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which 
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult . . . questions.”102  
So long as a party seeking to invoke the power of the federal courts alleged 
a sufficient “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” to effectuate 
that purpose,103 Article III posed no obstacle to standing. 
Over time, the Supreme Court has imposed more constitutional 
requirements for standing on plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief in federal 
court.  In Wright, the Supreme Court described the now-familiar “core 
component” of Article III standing as requiring plaintiffs to allege “personal 
injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and 
likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”104  Although the contours of 
standing’s constitutional core are “concededly not susceptible of precise 
definition,” a court assessing a complaint’s bare allegations must ask: “Is the 
injury too abstract, or otherwise not appropriate, to be considered judicially 
cognizable?  Is the line of causation between the illegal conduct and injury 
too attenuated?  Is the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a 
result of a favorable ruling too speculative?”105 
Under this test, plaintiffs alleging judicially cognizable injuries may still 
fail to qualify for judicial resolution of their claims where relief might not 
follow directly and with certainty from a federal court order.  In particular, 
where plaintiffs are not themselves subject to the agency rules they 
challenge, the Wright Court foreclosed standing because full redress would 
require federal courts not merely to curb government agency action against 
regulated entities but also to “restructur[e]” Executive Branch operations 
and act “as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of 
Executive action.”106  For the first time, the Court announced that the 
three-part standing requirement “derive[s] directly from the Constitution,” 
specifically “a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”107  The 
 
 101. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 102. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).  
 103. Id. 
 104. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).  The injury requirement has 
subsequently been interpreted to require “actual or imminent” threat of suffering “concrete 
and particularized” injury in fact.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000).  
 105. Wright, 468 U.S. at 751–52. 
 106. Id. at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)); see also Antonin Scalia, 
The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
881, 896 (1983) (arguing that the role of federal courts is to protect individuals from the 
majority, not to decide what is best for the people). 
 107. Wright, 468 U.S. at 751–52.  
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Wright Court thus transformed Article III’s requirement of “concrete 
adverseness” as a practical necessity for quality decisionmaking into a 
“concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a 
democratic society” and, consequently, their authority to engage such 
decisionmaking in the first place.108 
Far from maintaining the separation of powers, restrictive standing 
doctrine absolves federal courts of their unique duty to interpret 
constitutional mandates and congressional enactments to be carried out by 
the Executive Branch.109  As a result, the doctrine insulates government 
action against even congressionally authorized federal court oversight 
under a range of citizen-suit provisions, including the APA, which entitle 
any aggrieved party to seek judicial review of federal agency action in order 
to protect the interests of a broad range of regulatory stakeholders.110 
Under current constitutional standing doctrine, parties challenging the 
economic burdens of regulation routinely have access to federal courts,111 
while other regulatory stakeholders face substantial barriers to protecting 
their rights under regulatory schemes according to legislative design.  The 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that the fact that no plaintiff may exist 
with standing to litigate a claim is no reason to grant standing to 
unqualified parties.112  However, a stark asymmetry favoring court access 
only for certain kinds of federal litigants—for example, private entities 
challenging increased costs of business instead of other stakeholders who 
 
 108. Id. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative Law, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 18 (2011) (tracing the move from justification based on concern for 
“adverseness necessary to make out a constitutional case or controversy” to concern for 
“separation of powers, namely with keeping courts within their proper role in government”). 
 109. See Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 653, 670 (1985) (arguing that judicial review promotes the separation of powers by 
ensuring the effectuation of congressional will); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 601–02 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality opinion as an 
attempt “to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the 
courts—but of Congress, from which that power originates and emanates,” and as 
“based . . . on [an] invitation of executive lawlessness”). 
 110. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 111. Regulated entities, however, are not guaranteed judicial review.  Heather Elliott, 
The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 491–92 (2008); see Elliott, supra note 17, at 
173 n.70 (noting lack of standing for a regulated entity seeking further clarification of 
Department of Transportation policy in Am. Chemistry Council v. Dep’t of Transp., 468 
F.3d 810, 815–22 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
 112. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 
(1974) (“The assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have 
standing, is not a reason to find standing.”).  
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lack the financial and political power to influence the regulatory process—is 
more troubling.113  As Professor Bandes observes, “The usual answer is that 
the government has the sole interest in enforcing the law, and that it will be 
assumed to be representing even interest groups who claim their interests 
are being ignored or misrepresented.”114  Instead, “those defending 
pocketbook interests will continue to have ready access to the courts, but 
those seeking to vindicate the public interest will not.”115 
B.  Prudential Limits on Federal Court Standing 
Plaintiffs’ standing to seek judicial review of federal agency action was 
never questioned in the earliest cases challenging IRS rules governing tax-
exempt public charities.  Hence, in Green v. Connally, a 1969 federal class 
action filed by black families of public schoolchildren in Mississippi, the 
three-judge district court could simply announce that plaintiffs “have 
standing to attack the constitutionality of statutory provisions which they 
claim provide[] an unconstitutional system of benefits and matching grants 
that fosters and supports a system of segregated private schools as an 
alternative available to white students seeking to avoid desegregated public 
schools.”116  Likewise, in Eastern Kentucky, the district court easily granted 
standing on the basis of existing precedent117—a conclusion that the D.C. 
Circuit upheld in a footnote.118 
Yet the plaintiffs’ claims in Eastern Kentucky and Wright did raise particular 
concerns for federal courts, which have created self-imposed prudential 
limits on standing in order to promote pragmatic goals such as judicial 
 
 113. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in 
Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 655, 680 (1985) (“Depriving public interest 
advocates of their newly-won legal rights while allowing industry to challenge regulations 
through extensive formal procedures and ‘hard look’ review would clearly have a lopsided 
impact.”). 
 114. Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 331, 335 (1999).  
 115. Field, supra note 69, at 430–31 (protesting agency decisions as “‘Robin Hood in 
reverse’—i.e., decisions which give to the few and powerful at the expense of the many and 
the weak”); see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 
B.U. L. REV. 301, 304 (2002) (noting that the injury standard “systematically favors the 
powerful over the powerless”).  
 116. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1132. (D.D.C. 1970), summarily aff’d sub nom. 
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (leaving the standing issue raised in certiorari petition 
unaddressed). 
 117. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citing 
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973)). 
 118. Id. at 1282 n.6. 
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efficiency and fairness to nonparties.119  First, in cases arising under the 
APA, plaintiffs must establish that the “‘interest sought to be protected . . . 
[is] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated’” by 
the challenged federal law.120  The precise limits of a statute’s “zone of 
interests” are difficult to discern, but are to be defined with great 
leniency.121  In Eastern Kentucky’s APA challenge, the D.C. Circuit rejected 
“the government’s conclusion that [the Internal Revenue] Code provisions” 
governing exemption and deductibility of donations to charitable hospitals 
“are in no way intended to aid” plaintiffs who would be hospital patients 
were it not for their inability to pay.122  Had the Wright plaintiffs proceeded 
under the APA in addition to the Equal Protection Clause, they might have 
presented a closer call as families of children prevented from attending fully 
desegregated public schools due to white flight to tax-exempt private 
schools.123  Still, the legislative history and purpose of the tax-exemption 
scheme indicates that it is designed to complement rather than frustrate the 
provision of existing government services; accordingly, the interests of 
public schoolchildren in fully desegregated public schools “arguably fall[]” 
within the zone of interests protected by the tax-exemption scheme for 
private schools.124 
Relatedly, because plaintiffs sought to expand obligations imposed by a 
federal agency on others, they could be characterized as “third parties not 
themselves subject to coercive government regulation but affected by 
regulation of others.”125  As such, they could be viewed as seeking to 
 
 119. See Bradford C. Mank, Reading the Standing Tea Leaves in American Electric Power 
Co. v. Connecticut, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 543, 548 (2012) (“[F]ederal courts may impose 
prudential standing requirements to limit unreasonable demands on limited judicial 
resources or for other judicial policy reasons.”).  
 120. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 489 
(1998).  The zone-of-interests inquiry is generally limited to cases under the APA.  
 121. Id. at 492; see generally Jonathan R. Siegel, Zone of Interests, 92 GEO. L.J. 317, 319, 368 
(2004) (recommending finding plaintiffs’ interests to be within the zone “unless Congress, in 
a statute other than the [APA], prescribes a more restrictive rule” to “focus [the Court’s] 
attention on implementing the congressional will”).  
 122. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Schultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 332–33 (D.D.C. 1973). 
 123. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 8, at 254, 256 (observing “symmetries” in standing 
analysis in APA cases and analysis of the private right of action for merely incidental 
beneficiaries under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—despite the fact that the APA is theoretically “more 
liberal”).  
 124. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 522 U.S. at 517 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see Match-E-
Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012) 
(“[W]e have always conspicuously included the word ‘arguably’ in the test to indicate that 
the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff.”). 
 125. Richard B. Stewart, Standing for Solidarity, 88 YALE L.J. 1559, 1560 (1979) (book 
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vindicate rights only “collateral” to those of absent “primary” rights holders 
who choose not to press their own claims.126  As stakeholders of, yet 
outsiders to, the regulatory relationship between the IRS and tax-exempt 
public charities, plaintiffs’ allegations of harm from agency rulemaking 
could be perceived as subordinate to the interests of the private, regulated 
entities actually subject to those rules.  Indeed, Professor, now Circuit 
Court Judge, Fletcher observed that the “difficult standing cases are almost 
always third party standing cases in the sense that the direct interests of the 
plaintiff are viewed as less important than the interests of non-parties” who 
may lack motivation to challenge the status quo.127  Nonetheless, plaintiffs 
seeking to vindicate their own “direct interests” warrant their own avenue 
to federal court review without regard to the existence or non-existence of 
other, higher-priority rights holders.  Professor Pfander has described cases 
like Eastern Kentucky and Wright as “derivative” and as involving a kind of 
triangulation through the method of an agency-forcing lawsuit, which 
“seek[s] to change the behavior of the regulated [entity] by acting through 
the regulatory agency.”128  By disrupting the traditional, bilateral, private 
rights model of federal court review,129 the cases raised the prospect of a 
wider range of litigants empowered to use the courts for reform based on 
more attenuated chains of causation linking government actions to 
plaintiffs’ injuries.  Not only did the cases raise thorny Palsgrafian questions 
about legal causation and the “orbit of duty” owed by government actors to 
foreseeably harmed parties,130 but they also invoked what has been called 
the “spooky” doctrine of horizontality, which recognizes government 
responsibility for a broad range of seemingly private orderings.131  To be 
 
review). 
 126. See Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 282 (1984) 
(observing that many third-party interests can be recharacterized as first-party interests); see 
also Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 316 (1990).  See generally Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
1321 (2000).  
 127. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 246 (1988); see, e.g., 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).  
 128. James E. Pfander, Triangulating Standing, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 829, 833 (2009) 
(“Here, the citizens seek to compel the agency to apply a more rigorous standard to the 
industry, or to enforce the law against a particular firm . . . .  Such suits have sometimes 
been called ‘agency-forcing litigation.’”).  
 129. See generally Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982).  
 130. See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1379 (1988). 
 131. See Helen Hershkoff, Horizontality and the “Spooky” Doctrines of American Law, 59 BUFF. 
L. REV. 455, 456–62 (2011) (citation omitted).  
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sure, by seeking to influence the behavior and decisions of regulated entities 
through the mechanism of federal agency oversight rather than through 
“case-by-case litigation against each allegedly offending school” or 
hospital,132 the plaintiffs in Wright and Eastern Kentucky sought to transform 
whole sectors of society—but only to the extent allegedly mandated by 
federal law. 
Finally, as parties not themselves subject to regulation who nonetheless 
sought government accountability in the implementation of regulatory 
schemes affecting their interests, plaintiffs implicated not only disfavored 
third-party interests but also generalized grievances, or injuries to 
“interest[s] . . . held in common by all members of the public” and 
therefore insufficiently particularized for judicial cognizance.133  Where an 
asserted injury boils down to a complaint potentially shared by all members 
of the public about unfair administration of the laws, courts routinely 
dismiss such generalized grievances to prevent overuse of the federal courts 
as “no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of 
concerned bystanders.”134 
To avoid the risk of engaging in “gratuitous adjudications” of such 
public rights,135 the Court imposed impossibly strict standards for directness 
of harm and likelihood of relief at the traceability and redressability 
stages—first as a prudential matter in Eastern Kentucky136 and later, in 
Wright,137 based on the same grounds recharacterized as constitutionally 
required to maintain the separation of powers.  As a result, even where 
regulatory stakeholders establish concrete, particularized injury above and 
beyond generalized grievances shared by all members of the public, they 
face significant limits to obtaining government accountability in agency 
 
 132. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Simon v. E. Ky. 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976) (“[N]o hospital is a defendant.”). 
 133. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220–21 (1974) 
(“[S]tanding to sue may not be predicated upon an interest . . . which is held in common by 
all members of the public . . . .”); see Mank, supra note 119, at 548 (observing that the 
“Supreme Court has been unclear” whether a bar on generalized grievances “is a prudential 
limitation or a constitutional one”).  Even the concrete economic injury suffered by an 
individual taxpayer through the alleged misallocation of federal revenue rarely, if ever, 
qualifies as cognizable injury due to the minute and diluted nature of the harm relative to 
that suffered by other taxpayers.  See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 
587, 593 (2007) (limiting taxpayer standing to challenge alleged violations of the 
Establishment Clause). 
 134. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 
669, 687 (1973).  
 135. See Nichol, supra note 81, at 657. 
 136. E. Ky., 426 U.S. at 44–45. 
 137. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 766 (1984).  
2-lu (Do Not Delete)3/30/2014 8:58 AM 
102 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [66:1 
decisionmaking in their own right.  The Court’s transformation of standing 
doctrine in Eastern Kentucky and Wright thus elevates prudential concerns to 
constitutional levels—at the risk of “leav[ing] governmentally caused 
injuries unredressed.”138 
C. Tax Exemption for Public Charities as Regulation in Standing Doctrine 
The Court’s explicit concerns about excessive intrusion into executive 
affairs in Wright masked a more subtle undercurrent in its reasoning.  
Crucially, the Court’s analysis in each case rested on a mischaracterization 
of the effects of IRS rulemaking on the behavior and decisions of tax-
exempt public charities as regulated entities.  At each stage of the analysis, 
the Court confronted the need for government accountability in tax 
administration but failed to credit the real influence of IRS decisions on a 
wide range of regulatory stakeholders.  The Court thus downplayed the 
IRS’s exclusive role in setting legally binding rules implementing the 
statutory tax-exemption scheme and instead treated the agency as merely 
an enforcer of federal mandates it played no role in interpreting.  By 
invoking broad prudential reasons and separation of powers grounds, the 
Court effectively insulated IRS rulemaking from judicial scrutiny and 
accountability in all but the most traditional challenges by regulated entities 
vindicating their own private interests. 
1. Injury-in-Fact 
On the surface, the plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky and Wright evoked a 
broad, generalized form of injury simply by challenging IRS rules 
recognizing federal tax-exempt status for public charities under 
circumstances allegedly in violation of federal statutes and the U.S. 
Constitution.139  By implementing tax exemption for public charities in 
contravention of federal mandates, the IRS theoretically offended any and 
all members of U.S. society with “an interest . . . in the effective 
administration of the tax laws.”140  More specifically, however, in Wright, 
 
 138. Nichol, supra note 81, at 657; see DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 
355 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“One can 
accept, as I do, the nonjusticiability of . . . federal and state taxpayer suits in federal court 
without endorsing as well the limitations on standing later declared in [cases including 
Eastern Kentucky and Wright].”). 
 139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012); IRC § 501(c)(3) (2012); 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). 
 140. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Tamm, J., dissenting) 
(alleging stigmatic injury amounts to a generalized grievance: “What the plaintiffs actually 
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the plaintiffs alleged that they bore an especial brunt of the injury because 
they suffered the stigma of being assigned second-class status based on race 
through the availability of a “federal stamp of approval”—tax-exempt 
status—to segregated private schools.141  Yet the Wright plaintiffs denied any 
personal interest in actually attending any currently segregated private 
school.142  Because they were not “personally subject” to the nationwide 
discriminatory policies they challenged, the Court held their stigmatic 
injury to be too abstract to meet Article III’s minimum requirements.143 
By contrast, the plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky did allege—and the Court 
recognized for purposes of Article III standing—the quintessentially 
personal injury of the inability to “receiv[e] . . . hospital treatment.”144  Like 
the Wright plaintiffs, however, they did not seek medical care from any 
particular tax-exempt hospital; rather, their broader grievance remained 
their decreased chance of obtaining medical care at any hospital in the 
absence of the charity-care requirement as a condition of tax exemption.  
As Justice Brennan clarified, concurring in the judgment only in Eastern 
Kentucky, plaintiffs were not alleging “that they have been and will be illegally 
denied the provision of indigent medical services by the hospitals,”145 but 
alleged a different, constitutionally sufficient “injury to their ‘opportunity 
and ability’ to receive medical services” because “the Internal Revenue 
Code requires the Government to offer economic inducements to the 
relevant hospitals only under conditions which are likely to benefit” 
them.146 
Following Justice Brennan’s lead, the Wright plaintiffs specifically 
disavowed any desire to actually receive educational services from tax-
exempt private schools147 and explicitly alleged an additional injury in the 
form of “their children’s diminished ability to receive an education in a 
racially integrated school.”148  In contrast to the Wright plaintiffs’ general 
allegation of stigmatic injury, the Court declared this narrower 
 
challenge here is the adequacy of agency enforcement procedures, arguing that the IRS has failed to 
weave its net of enforcement fine enough to catch all of the private schools that may 
discriminate on the basis of race”). 
 141. Joint Appendix at 19, Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (No. 81-757) (citing 
paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint).  
 142. Wright, 468 U.S. at 746. 
 143. Id. at 755–56 (finding “abstract stigmatic injur[ies]” insufficient for Article III 
standing).  
 144. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976).  
 145. Id. at 56. 
 146. Id.; see Winter, supra note 130, at 1470–73.  
 147. Brief for Respondents at 39, Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (No. 81-757). 
 148. Wright, 468 U.S. at 756. 
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characterization of plaintiffs’ harm to be, “beyond any doubt, not only 
judicially cognizable but . . . one of the most serious injuries recognized in 
our legal system.”149 
Ultimately, the plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky and Wright succeeded in 
demonstrating concrete, particularized harm to themselves that 
distinguished them from the general population of individuals aggrieved by 
racial and class disparities in health care and education or, at an even more 
basic level, by unfair administration of the tax-exemption scheme.  In each 
case, plaintiffs cleared the threshold for particularized injury by alleging 
straightforward personal harm resulting from the tax-exemption scheme for 
public charities.  Yet the precise characterization of their alleged injuries 
only served to raise the Court’s standards for the traceability and 
redressability prongs of the standing inquiry based on concerns about 
judicial authority to intervene in government operations. 
2. Traceability 
If, as Professor Chayes argued, what plaintiffs ultimately sought was 
access to benefits—whether or not provided by tax-exempt entities—in an 
economic setting that “accurately reflect[ed]” the cost-savings of federal tax 
exemptions and tax-deductible donations as intended by Congress, then the 
IRS’s exclusive role in determining the precise parameters of tax exemption 
should have sufficed to meet the traceability requirement.150  The plaintiffs 
in both Eastern Kentucky and Wright sought to compel the IRS to adopt rules 
requiring exempt public charities to change their practices—to plaintiffs’ 
benefit—in order to retain tax-exempt status and eligibility for tax-
deductible donations.  The Eastern Kentucky plaintiffs produced evidence that 
most tax-exempt hospitals could ill afford to lose deductible donations 
 
 149. Id. (citing cases ranging from Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to the 
previous term’s decision in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)). 
 150. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 80 (1984); see Chayes, 
supra note 129, at 19 (recharacterizing the injury at issue as “not the interest in obtaining free 
medical services at a particular hospital, but in having hospitals’ decisions whether to 
provide free services reflect accurately the incentive structure that Congress established—
presumably based on a judgment that the incentive is sufficient to call forth the desired 
overall amount of services for indigents” and concluding that “Congress must believe that 
these measures have some efficacy in inducing desired conduct on the part of taxpayers”); see 
also Dellums v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 863 F.2d 968, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The proper threshold inquiry . . . is whether Congress reasonably 
predicted that enforcement of the Act as a whole would effect changes sufficient to alleviate 
petitioners’ injuries.”). 
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based on that status.151  If at least some hospitals reallocated their resources 
and increased their levels of charity care to prevent that outcome, plaintiffs 
would necessarily have more options for free medical treatment.  Similarly, 
if racially segregated private schools could no longer depend on the same 
level of deductible donations based on their status as exempt public 
charities, the cost of drawing white children away from public schools 
would increase, raising the likelihood that at least some would end their 
discriminatory policies or cease to exist.152 
Because the Eastern Kentucky majority instead described the injury to poor 
plaintiffs as the actual denial of medical treatment by tax-exempt hospitals, 
it could then conclude that, “it is purely speculative whether the denials of 
service . . . fairly can be traced to [IRS] ‘encouragement’ or instead 
result[ed] from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax 
implications.”153  In short, the Court found that plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate traceability because they could not establish that the IRS’s 
change in policy was the but-for cause of their individual service denials.154  
When their injury is reframed as a decreased likelihood of obtaining health 
care in the economic climate Congress intended, however, the IRS’s role 
becomes indispensable, for the IRS alone establishes the tax consequences 
of all exempt hospitals’ charity-care decisions, regardless of whether 
individual charities ultimately are willing to absorb them. 
In Wright, the plaintiffs described their injury more accurately as the 
“diminished ability to receive an education in a racially integrated 
school.”155  Yet the Court again failed to find such an injury fairly traceable 
to IRS decisionmaking without evidence that “there were enough racially 
discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in respondents’ 
communities for withdrawal of those exemptions to make an appreciable 
difference in public school integration.”156  A marginal increase in the 
 
 151. E. Ky., 426 U.S. at 43. 
 152. Wright, 468 U.S. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 153. E. Ky., 426 U.S. at 42–43. 
 154. See Winter, supra note 130, at 1470–71. 
 155. Wright, 468 U.S. at 756. 
 156. The Court continued: 
It is just as speculative whether any given parent of a child attending such a private 
school would decide to transfer the child to public school as a result of any changes in 
educational or financial policy made by the private school once it was threatened with 
loss of tax-exempt status.  It is also pure speculation whether, in a particular 
community, a large enough number of the numerous relevant school officials and 
parents would reach decisions that collectively would have a significant impact on the 
racial composition of the public schools. 
Id. at 758.  But see id. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that plaintiffs met the standard 
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likelihood of a desegregated public school district would not suffice.  
Equally speculative, as under Eastern Kentucky, was the question “whether 
withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular school would lead the 
school to change its policies.”157  The Court thus found that the Wright 
plaintiffs failed to establish even the possibility of a marginal increase in 
their chances at a desegregated education.  In fact, all of the “speculative” 
decisions identified by the Court share one certainty in common: each 
depends on a decision of the IRS to assign tax costs and consequences as 
part of the calculus. 
Instead of recognizing the agency role in setting minimum requirements 
for tax-exempt public charities’ behavior, the Court in Eastern Kentucky and 
Wright treated plaintiffs’ claims as attempts to usurp the IRS’s individual 
enforcement decisions despite the fact that their “own tax liability was not 
affected.”158  In Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,159 decided several years earlier, the 
Court denied standing to a custodial parent to challenge a criminal 
prosecutor’s child-support enforcement policy of declining to prosecute 
parents who had never married the custodial parent, in part because 
criminal prosecution might result only in the noncustodial parent’s 
incarceration rather than the actual payment of child support.160  The 
Court thus implied that the sole duty of a criminal prosecutor is to make 
individual decisions to punish noncompliance rather than to set broadly 
applicable rules and policies that may prospectively influence—and deter—
the behavior and decisionmaking of those subject to their mandates. 
In the tax-exemption context, the Court likewise failed to recognize the 
IRS’s role in not only penalizing noncompliance but also determining the 
tax costs and benefits that influence public charities’ choices.  Professor 
Nichol observes that in both cases the Court “effectively presume[d],” 
contrary to congressional judgment, “that private actors are not 
substantially likely to alter their behavior in order to obtain tax-exempt 
status.”161  Certainly some might decide that exemption and deductible 
 
by referring by name to 20 schools in two jurisdictions falling under desegregation orders 
“that discriminate on the basis of race and yet continue to benefit illegally from tax-exempt 
status”).  
 157. Id. at 758. 
 158. E. Ky., 426 U.S. at 46 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 159. 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
 160. Id. at 614–18.  But see Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam) 
(striking down the same policies under the Equal Protection Clause in a case brought by a 
married parent). 
 161. Nichol, supra note 81, at 656; see Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 879 
F.2d 880, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal funding of facilities that engage in proscribed 
discrimination is in part causative of the perpetuation of such discrimination, 
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contributions are no longer worth the additional constraints.162  However, 
the decision would be made in a regulatory regime that, if plaintiffs 
prevailed on the merits, would be corrected to comport with congressional 
intent and constitutional mandates.  Private schools that failed to 
“demonstrate that they do not provide racially segregated educational 
opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in desegregating 
public school systems” would be compelled either to make such a 
demonstration or to accept the risk of being forced to begin paying taxes 
and receiving only nondeductible donations.163  Hospitals that failed to 
provide charity care would likewise do so in a reformed regulatory 
environment posing the risk of revocation and ineligibility for deductible 
donations for noncompliance, a cost they did not previously have to take 
into account. 
Whether changes in the IRS tax-exemption rules impose quantifiable 
economic costs exceeding the benefits of exempt status, public charities 
derive intangible benefits from the “halo effect” that surrounds entities 
exempt from taxation and eligible for deductible donations based on their 
provision of a public benefit.164  As Professors Hill and Hickman argue, 
private entities subject to federal regulation in all areas respond both to 
agency rules that deter or encourage particular behavior as well as to 
agency efforts at “persuasion, education, and assistance.”165  Public 
charities, likewise, base their behavior “on their assessments of costs and 
benefits broadly construed, including not only monetary savings and the 
possibility of legal sanctions, but also extra-legal rewards and sanctions 
relating to reputation, . . . feelings of virtue and law-abidingness, and other 
factors.”166  Accordingly, the intangible benefit of charitable tax-exempt 
status’s “halo effect” or “stamp of approval” may be a determining factor—
if not the determining factor—for many public charities’ decisionmaking. 
The Eastern Kentucky Court warned that “indirectness of injury, while not 
 
and . . . ‘initiating federal fund termination proceedings [is] highly effective in gaining 
compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws.’”) (citation omitted).  
 162. In fact, some might be willing to pay for the privilege of discriminating.  See Galle, 
supra note 41, at 850 (asserting that the lack of government support can “strengthen[] . . . 
[members’] own resolve to contribute” to make up the difference).  
 163. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 769 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 164. See Kristin E. Hickman, How Did We Get Here Anyway?: Considering the Standing Question 
in DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 70 (2006) (“[E]mpirical research 
suggest[s] that tax incentives are more politically symbolic than economically influential.”).  
 165. Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the 
Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1160–66 (2010). 
 166. See id. at 1160, 1174 (stating that administrative law generally features 
“susceptibility to planning by minimal compliers”). 
2-lu (Do Not Delete)3/30/2014 8:58 AM 
108 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [66:1 
necessarily fatal to standing, ‘may make it substantially more difficult’” for 
third parties to the regulatory relationship to meet Article III’s minimum 
requirements.167  In Wright, the Court transformed the high bar for standing 
in such contexts into a constitutional limit.  In the Court’s view, not only 
did indirectness of injury limit federal agencies’ ability to provide the 
requisite relief to satisfy traceability, but it also precluded redressability by 
requiring federal courts to overstep their authority by saddling agencies 
with affirmative obligations. 
3. Redressability 
The Court in Wright stressed that redressability analysis is distinct from 
that of traceability, although where the relief requested is “simply the 
cessation of the allegedly illegal conduct,” the analysis “is identical.”168  
Consequently, the Eastern Kentucky majority’s redressability analysis 
concluded, “the complaint suggests no substantial likelihood that victory in 
this suit would result in [plaintiffs’] receiving the hospital treatment they 
desire”169 because, under the Court’s traceability analysis, invalidating the 
IRS’s new rule in favor of the IRS’s former charity-care requirement might 
have no effect on exempt hospitals’ decisions.170  However, the Court cited 
additional concerns regarding affirmative court intervention in government 
agency action that defeated the Wright plaintiffs’ claims at the redressability 
stage.  First, because the plaintiffs sought to increase the likelihood of 
desegregation in public schools by restricting tax exemption for racially 
segregated private schools, the Court determined that the relief sought 
could not go far enough and might be futile in the absence of those private 
schools as parties to the lawsuit.171  What the plaintiffs sought, however, was 
not enforcement against specific nonparties not before the court, but a 
recalibration of the conditions under which any and all private schools 
could seek tax-exempt status; this could only be effectuated by the IRS 
through its rule-setting function. 
 
 167. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44–45 (1976) (quoting Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975)). 
 168. Wright, 468 U.S. at 759 n.24. 
 169. E. Ky., 426 U.S. at 45–46.  
 170. The “denials of service” they experienced might “result from decisions made by the 
hospitals without regard to the tax implications.”  Id. at 42–43.  However, the question, as 
Justice Brennan clarified it, was how much factual or probabilistic evidence should be 
required to determine justiciability.  Id. at 54–55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 171. See Wright, 468 U.S. at 759; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between 
Justiciability and Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006) 
(describing “practically unacceptable” or incomplete relief). 
2-lu (Do Not Delete)3/30/2014 8:58 AM 
2014] STANDING IN THE SHADOW OF TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 109 
At the same time, the Wright majority determined that plaintiffs’ request 
for relief sought too much,172 because the Wright plaintiffs requested not 
only declaratory relief ending the IRS’s policy extending tax exemption to 
racially segregated private schools but also injunctive relief mandating that 
the IRS amend its tax-exemption rules accordingly.173  The balance of the 
Court’s redressability analysis focused on the limits of judicial power to 
oversee government agency operations.  Justice O’Connor’s majority 
opinion explicitly disavowed the federal courts’ role “as virtually continuing 
monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”174  While some 
egregious circumstances might warrant review, where plaintiffs bring suit 
“not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct 
harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the 
Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties,” the federal courts are powerless 
to provide that relief.175 
Furthermore, according to Justice O’Connor, in Wright, “the relief 
requested goes well beyond the violation of law alleged”176 by compelling 
adoption of measures to eliminate constitutionally permissible de facto 
segregation from tax-exempt private schools, regardless of whether those 
schools intentionally discriminated on the basis of race.177  While the Court 
strongly rejected the argument that the Equal Protection Clause imposed 
such “specific legal obligations” on the IRS,178 the question remains 
 
 172. The Court characterized plaintiffs’ requested relief as “substantially similar to the 
enforcement guidelines promulgated by the IRS itself in 1978 and 1979, before 
congressional action temporarily stayed, and the agency withdrew, the amended 
procedures.”  Wright, 468 U.S. at 769; see 44 Fed. Reg. 9451, 9454 (Feb. 13, 1979) (revising 
proposed procedure to require schools to engage in “actions and programs reasonably 
designed to attract minority students,” which may vary from school to school); 43 Fed. Reg. 
37,296, 37,298 (Aug. 22, 1978) (proposing revenue procedure requiring “operation in good 
faith on a racially nondiscriminatory basis” based on several factors).  For more details on 
Congress’s action preventing the amended procedures from taking effect, see Archie Parnell, 
Congressional Interference in Agency Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360, 1374–75, 
1380–86 (1980) (discussing the inappropriate use of appropriations bills to impliedly amend 
the substantive IRC, thereby freezing the administration of tax law). 
 173. Brief for Respondents at 48, Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (No. 81-757); see 
Wright, 468 U.S. at 746–47. 
 174. Wright, 468 U.S. at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)). 
 175. Id. at 761. 
 176. Id. at 753 n.19 (noting that cases in which plaintiffs seek relief broader than a mere 
correction of the alleged unlawful conduct demonstrate the need to keep the traceability and 
redressability prongs of the standing test distinct from each other).  
 177. See id.  In Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., however, Justice Douglas noted that 
the Equal Protection Clause does not distinguish de facto from de jure segregation.  See 413 
U.S. 189, 214–15 (1973) (Douglas, J. concurring).  
 178. See also Sugin, supra note 19, at 448 (stating that if the Bob Jones Court “had adopted 
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whether the requested relief could redress the IRS’s alleged independent 
violations of § 501(c)(3), and whether that statute requires more from 
exempt public charities under the public policy prohibition announced one 
term before in Bob Jones.179  Only full recognition of how tax-exemption 
administration operates as a form of federal regulation—and as 
government agency action subject to congressionally authorized judicial 
review under the APA—could determine what, precisely, was required to 
accomplish the statutory goals of the tax-exemption scheme.  Yet the 
Court’s restrictive view of the cases as essentially individual enforcement 
efforts prevented it from treating the tax-exemption scheme as regulation of 
behavior subject to public accountability.  In the absence of that routine 
administrative framework for analysis, the Court was free to rely on a broad 
separation of powers rationale not limited to any particular administrative 
context. 
For the Supreme Court, judicial review is precluded by the separation of 
powers principle in the unique situation where stakeholders of federal 
regulation challenge agency rules because the necessary relief requires too 
much scrutiny “of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”180  Yet 
judicial review remains available where regulated entities seek to reform 
agency rules to their advantage.  As the district court recognized in Eastern 
Kentucky, the need for a judicial check to ensure the legitimacy of federal 
agency action is not limited to those bearing the burdens of regulation; the 
fact that an IRS rule does “not produce protesting [tax-exempt entities] 
eager to challenge its policy and application should not immunize [it] from 
such a testing where . . . the Code policy it purports to serve has a 
fundamental purpose of aiding and benefiting . . . . [people] other than 
those whose tax returns are immediately affected.”181  The Court’s 
separation of powers concerns are thus exaggerated where regulatory 
stakeholders seek to enforce federal agency obligations.  To the contrary, 
where such a judicial check is only available to regulated entities, the risk of 
agency capture arises.  Therefore, in tax, as in other administrative 
contexts, broader standing in federal court remains essential to correct an 
imbalance in regulatory stakeholder power and enforce congressional 
mandates in the implementation of regulatory schemes. 
 
the strong version of tax expenditure analysis,” it would have followed Norwood v. 
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), to strike down funding to segregated schools). 
 179. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 595–96 (1983). 
 180. Wright, 468 U.S. at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 181. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 333 (D.D.C. 1973).  
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III. THE EROSION OF TAX EXCEPTIONALISM IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
TAX ADMINISTRATION 
Critics have assailed the constitutionalization of the traceability and 
redressability requirements of standing in Wright to foreclose federal court 
challenges of agency rules by regulatory stakeholders alleging 
particularized, concrete injuries.182  Subsequent cases may have preserved 
the availability of standing to challenge agency action to holders of 
informational or procedural rights whose violation affects unrelated 
concrete interests.183  Where such procedural injuries are alleged, the 
redressability bar may be set lower so that plaintiffs need not demonstrate 
that a favorable court decision would necessarily result in a different 
outcome the second time around, but only that the decisionmaking process 
would comport with statutory requirements designed to promote 
transparency and fairness.184  The bar has, however, remained high for 
regulatory stakeholders challenging substantive agency rules.185 
Professor Sunstein has criticized the majority decisions in Eastern Kentucky 
and Wright as “incorrectly decided if they are taken as pure redressability 
cases” and dubious to the extent that they “focus[] on the exercise of 
discretion by a private [third] party” to preclude traceability.186  Instead, in 
keeping with Justice Stewart’s short Eastern Kentucky concurrence,187 
Sunstein distinguishes the decisions “as a matter of construction of the 
Internal Revenue Code,”188 because Congress is “generally not understood 
 
 182. See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 81, at 655–56; see also Sunstein, supra note 61, at 615–17. 
 183. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23–26 (1998) (asserting courts can 
address informational injuries resulting from Federal Election Commission’s (FEC’s) 
decisions); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(finding no injury but allowing theoretical possibility of procedural injury under a lower 
standard); Kimberly N. Brown, What’s Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and the Battle for Judicial 
Review, 55 KAN. L. REV. 677, 722 (2007) (suggesting that Akins be read as “expressly 
disavowing the causation and redressability prongs of the traditional test for administrative 
cases, where they have little content, and look primarily to whether Congress created a 
nonabstract ‘injury’—by, for example, conferring a right to information”); see also 
Massachusettes v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007); see generally Sunstein, supra note 61. 
 184. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Making Sense of Procedural Injury, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 n.4 
(2010). 
 185. The bar may also be lower where the regulatory stakeholder is a state.  See 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17. 
 186. Sunstein, supra note 61, at 648 n.173, 652 n.183.  
 187. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart, J., 
concurring); see also Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 879 F.2d 880, 885 n.3 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (characterizing J. Stewart’s “well-established position” as an additional 
reason to distinguish lack of standing in Wright and Eastern Kentucky). 
 188. Sunstein, supra note 61, at 649 n.177. 
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to allow one taxpayer to litigate the tax liability of another.”189  Similarly, 
Professor Stewart has described the opinions as hinging on special 
“considerations, admittedly inarticulate, as to the appropriate role of courts 
in the evolution of tax policy.”190  But it is far from clear why the IRC, in 
particular, should be interpreted to foreclose such standing.  To the 
contrary, the decision to regulate behavior through taxation rather than 
direct spending should not insulate such regulation from judicial oversight. 
Indeed, even when considered as explicitly exceptional cases, the 
decisions are unfounded, for federal courts increasingly reject the view that 
tax matters are exempt from the application of general administrative law 
principles, supporting judicial review of agency action to promote 
government accountability.191  To the extent that restrictions on standing 
for regulatory stakeholders rest on court decisions even partially or 
implicitly influenced by tax exceptionalism, then, those decisions are 
suspect.  Administrative law principles that support broad access to judicial 
review of agency action while guarding against judicial overreaching 
remain vital and increasingly applicable to the tax context.  As in other 
administrative contexts, other limits on judicial authority—most notably, 
the requirement of final agency action and deference accorded to agency 
expertise on the merits—assuage concerns about excessive court 
intervention in government agency affairs under federal separation of 
powers.  Accordingly, there is little to fear and much to gain from 
extending standing to regulatory stakeholders alleging particularized, 
concrete injuries through federal regulation to seek judicial review of 
substantive agency rules—whether in the tax context or in other 
administrative contexts.  Relaxing standing in this way would correct an 
imbalance of power that limits the influence of important stakeholders in 
government agency decisionmaking that affects their concrete interests. 
A. Tax Exceptionalism in Administrative Law 
In Eastern Kentucky, the IRS sought absolute immunity from judicial 
review of “determination[s] of general revenue policy” on the theory “that 
the entire history of this country’s revenue system . . . manifests a consistent 
congressional intent to vest exclusive authority for the administration of the 
tax laws in the Secretary and his duly authorized delegates, subject to 
 
 189. Id. at 652 n.183. 
 190. Stewart, supra note 125, at 1568.  
 191. See infra Part III.A; see also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714 (2011). 
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oversight by the appropriate committees of Congress itself.”192  While the 
Court rejected this broad-sweeping argument for immunity, it represents a 
pervasive theory that tax administration is fundamentally different from 
other administrative contexts because of its revenue-collecting purpose.193 
To be sure, the need for speedy collection of revenue has resulted in 
distinct legislative procedures that facilitate revenue assessment and 
collection, but at the expense of transparency and accountability.  Tax 
legislation generally proceeds through a nonpartisan joint tax committee 
rather than through both a separate subject-matter subcommittee and the 
appropriations committee.194  Tax provisions are not subject to annual 
review; rather, once enacted, they often remain embedded in the IRC.195  
Finally, tax provisions do not require annual appropriations and are not 
considered in the creation of the formal federal budget,196 although a 
separate budget accounts for “tax expenditures” that are the functional 
equivalent of direct spending.197  As a result of this unique legislative 
process for revenue enactments, commentators describe the revenue code 
as lacking overall coherence or clear purpose.198 
Certain tax administration procedures explicitly depart from generally 
applicable procedures for judicial review by congressional command.  The 
(Tax) Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) prohibits “any person” from 
“maintain[ing] in any court” a “suit for the purpose of restraining the 
 
 192. E. Ky., 426 U.S. at 36; see, e.g., Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 632 (1914) 
(demonstrating judicial review “would operate to disturb the whole revenue system of the 
Government”).  
 193. See, e.g., Caron, supra note 16, at 518–19.  
 194. See Susannah Camic Tahk, Everything is Tax: Evaluating the Structural Transformation of 
U.S. Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 69, 106 (2013) (noting close relationship of the 
IRS and Congress in drafting tax legislation); see generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and 
Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986) (stating that the 
tax agency remains insulated from interest-group influence because so many interest groups 
compete for its attention). 
 195. See Tahk, supra note 194, at 88–89 (noting difficulty of eliminating isolated 
provisions without affecting other parts of the IRC). 
 196. See Sheldon D. Pollack, Arenas of Federal Tax Policy, 135 TAX NOTES 1499, 1503 
(2012) (explaining that the tax code offers “an efficient and attractive tool for distributing 
particularized economic benefits to constituents” without drawing the scrutiny of a direct 
appropriation).  
 197. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344 § 3(a)(3), 88 Stat. 297, 299 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2012)) (requiring 
reporting of “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a 
special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special 
credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability”). 
 198. Hickman & Hill, supra note 165, at 1177 (stating that tax laws lack coherence and 
that the IRC’s purposes “are merely implied”).  
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assessment or collection of any tax.”199  Similarly, the Declaratory 
Judgment Act (DJA) precludes suit for declaratory relief “with respect to 
Federal taxes.”200  Both Acts may “protect[] . . . the Government’s need to 
assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of pre-
enforcement judicial interference.”201  Accordingly, taxpayers seeking relief 
against the burdens of revenue rules must generally wait to raise their 
claims in a post-enforcement deficiency action or refund suit.  Nonetheless, 
where Congress seeks to promote particular regulatory goals over efficient 
revenue collection, it has acted to render the AIA and DJA inapplicable.202 
Aside from specific congressional enactments, the IRS’s role in the swift 
and efficient collection of revenue should not detract from its equally 
important role in protecting stakeholder interests in the implementation of 
revenue rules that affect them.  As Professor Sugin argues, “The increasing 
importance of the tax law as one of the few vessels that can still be 
legitimately filled with federal policy places pressure on the traditionally 
insular perspective of tax policy.”203  While tax administrators may be 
somewhat insulated from interest group influence, they may not be 
sufficiently attuned to the interests of a broad range of regulatory 
stakeholders.  Tax regulation forms part of a “larger political and social 
structure” in need of transparency and accountability to the public.204  
Professor Hickman argues that “Contemporary U.S. tax administrative 
practices [instead] have shifted [the] balance more toward efficiency and 
flexibility” by weakening procedural protections for regulatory stakeholders 
in agency decisionmaking “in developing the laws that govern taxpayer 
 
 199. IRC § 7421(a) (2012).  
 200. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).  In Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 728 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (en banc), the D.C. Circuit reconfirmed the holding of Eastern Kentucky (never 
reviewed by the Supreme Court) that the Anti-Injunction Act’s and Declaratory Judgment 
Act’s limits on equitable relief are “coterminous” and “narrow[].”  Furthermore, both Acts 
are inapplicable where plaintiffs, “rather than attempting to negate the levy of a 
tax, . . . seek[] to force the Government to impose a tax,” because in such cases “the 
Government is [not] faced with any threat to the actual assessment or collection of the taxes 
to which it deems itself entitled.”  E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 
1284 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev’d on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
 201. E. Ky., 506 F.2d at 1284 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 
(1974)).  
 202. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding that the 
individual mandate to purchase health insurance subject to penalty enforced through the 
IRC is not a “tax” for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act); see also Cohen v. United States, 
578 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (permitting pre-enforcement suit for Byzantine procedure where 
liability not at issue).  
 203. Sugin, supra note 19, at 474.  
 204. Id. at 474 n.302 (discussing John Stuart Mill). 
2-lu (Do Not Delete)3/30/2014 8:58 AM 
2014] STANDING IN THE SHADOW OF TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 115 
behavior,” thereby insulating revenue rules from political or judicial 
oversight.205 
The IRS is particularly notorious for issuing numerous rules and 
guidance documents that govern taxpayer behavior while bypassing the 
procedural protections of the APA that require agency consideration of 
public input by invoking the statutory exception to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking for “interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of 
agency organization, procedure, or practice.”206  While full stakeholder 
participation in IRS rulemaking may not always be required or 
advisable,207 overreliance on such rules on the theory that they are 
“nonlegislative”—even where they operate to legally bind regulated 
entities—may exacerbate power and informational imbalances among 
stakeholders.208  While the IRS sometimes voluntarily invites public 
comments on proposed rules prior to adoption,209 without the promise of 
public notice or a considered response to any feedback received,210 the 
interests or viewpoints of non-expert stakeholders may be crowded out by 
those of better-represented and better-informed regulated entities who have 
experience with tax administration.211  Even where the agency does initiate 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, many regulatory stakeholders may be 
difficult to identify and mobilize in advance of any harmful impact.212  
 
 205. Kristin E. Hickman, The Promise and the Reality of U.S. Tax Administration, in THE 
DELICATE BALANCE: TAX, DISCRETION AND THE RULE OF LAW 39, 62 (Chris Evans et al. 
eds., 2011); see also Book, supra note 7, at 766 (“As the tax system has evolved into a complex 
dynamic with functions that extend far beyond revenue collection, the need for heightened 
expedience that often accompanies agencies wishing to bypass procedural checks is less 
compelling.”). 
 206. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012); see Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: 
Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1728–31 (2007). 
 207. For example, “when the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public 
procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”  5 
U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B); see Beermann, supra note 108, at 27 (“[J]udicial activism in 
administrative law has been criticized . . . for contributing to the ‘ossification’ of 
rulemaking . . . .”).  
 208. Hickman, supra note 205, at 53 (“[T]he IRS routinely issues a collection of 
guidance documents that are only marginally less legally binding [than notice-and-comment 
regulations] but that the agency nevertheless rarely submits for public comment.”).  
 209. See, e.g., IRS Notice 2011-52, 2011-30 I.R.B.  
 210. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).  
 211. This result also crowds out less sophisticated taxpayers.  See Book, supra note 7, at 
767–68. 
 212. Even the notice-and-comment process can undervalue the voices of the public.  See 
Mendelson, supra note 100, at 1380 (stating that agencies should “engage comments on the 
value-laden questions more seriously, including the comments of lay persons submitted in 
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Agency failure to adhere to the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements 
raises risks that important stakeholder voices will be undervalued in agency 
decisionmaking and unable to seek judicial review of either the rulemaking 
process or the substantive outcome of resulting rules. 
Like most federal agencies, the IRS is also statutorily required to receive 
petitions for rulemaking and to respond with reasons if it declines to initiate 
notice-and-comment proceedings.213  However, it is not clear whether the 
statutory mandate requires the agency to explain a decision not to issue any 
other form of guidance, such as revenue rulings or notices, as well.214  Nor 
does the statute impose any particular timeframe within which the IRS 
must respond to petitions.215  Accordingly, like other agencies, the IRS may 
engage in “foot-dragging” in carrying out its statutory obligation to 
implement federal mandates, including under the public-charities 
exemption scheme.216  Procedural protections—including judicial review of 
agency action—are thus required as much in tax administration as in other 
contexts to protect the interests of stakeholders who lack the political, 
financial, informational, or other resources to influence agency or legislative 
decisionmaking. 
Related to the tax exceptionalist view of tax administration as being 
solely about unimpeded revenue collection is the view that revenue 
collection involves only the post hoc enforcement of pre-existing tax rules 
against individual taxpayers.  Justice Stevens expressed some sympathy for 
the view that the IRS was entitled to prosecutorial discretion in 
enforcement decisions even as he dissented in the rulemaking challenge in 
Wright: “The Executive requires latitude to decide how best to enforce the 
law, and in general the Court may well be correct that the exercise of that 
 
large numbers”); Wagner, supra note 100, at 1325 (describing how “the excessive use of 
information and related information costs” by “well-financed interest groups” may result in 
“information capture” as a way “of gaining control over regulatory decisionmaking in 
informal rulemakings”).  
 213. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (requiring agencies to accept petitions for rulemaking); id. 
§ 555(e) (requiring agencies to respond to petitions made “in connection with any agency 
proceeding”).  The IRS must give such petitions “careful consideration.”  Treas. Reg. 
§ 601.601(c) (subject to exceptions not relevant here); see also Sean Croston, The Petition Is 
Mightier than the Sword: Rediscovering an Old Weapon in the Battles over “Regulation Through Guidance”, 
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 381, 399 (2011) (predicting more petitions and attempts at judicial 
review).  
 214. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 50–51 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (suggesting that plaintiffs should have submitted such a petition for rulemaking). 
 215. See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principle-Agent Approach Can 
Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381 
(2011) (exploring the causes and consequences of agency delays and inaction). 
 216. See id. at 1383–85. 
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discretion, especially in the tax context, is unchallengeable.”217 
Although the majorities in Eastern Kentucky and Wright did not explicitly 
rely on the tax-specific context of each plaintiffs’ claims as a reason to deny 
standing,218 tax exceptionalism nevertheless colored the Court’s analyses of 
each prong of the standing inquiry as it ignored the vital role of the IRS in 
going beyond its prosecutorial role to regulate prospectively the behavior 
and decisions of public charities and their donors.  In effect, the Court 
declined to treat public-charities regulation as a working administrative 
scheme with substantial economic incentives and practical impact on 
exempt entities’ organization and operations. 
Yet in policing the outer bounds of proper revenue collection, the IRS 
necessarily establishes prospective rules and standards for compliance that 
give content to statutory mandates reflecting important public values219—
with important consequences for other stakeholders.  In 2011, in Mayo 
Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States, the Supreme 
Court clearly rejected an exception to general administrative law principles 
for tax matters and recognized the agency’s vital role not only in collecting 
revenue from individual taxpayers but also in promulgating broadly 
applicable regulations implementing legislative mandates: “Filling gaps in 
the Internal Revenue Code plainly requires the Treasury Department to 
make interpretive choices for statutory implementation at least as complex 
as the ones other agencies must make in administering their statutes.”220  
Plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky and Wright challenged agency action in statutory 
implementation rather than individual enforcement decisions.  
Accordingly, as in other administrative contexts, as the Mayo Court 
recognized, no special rules should apply in tax cases to alter the existing 
balance among the federal branches in subjecting executive action to 
oversight while respecting agency needs for autonomy and flexibility. 
The rejection of “tax exceptionalism” signals federal courts’ recognition 
of the need, as in other administrative contexts, to safeguard stakeholder 
interests in the formation of broadly applicable revenue rules through 
crucial administrative procedural protections—including judicial review of 
agency action.221  Today, general administrative law principles increasingly 
 
 217. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 793 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  
 218. See supra Part II.C. 
 219. See Lemos, supra note 62, at 701–04 (distinguishing between individual enforcement 
authority and rulemaking).   
 220. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 
(2011). 
 221. See, e.g., id. (rejecting tax exceptionalism and instead applying Chevron deference); 
Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 733–34 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (authorizing a 
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apply in the tax context to expand access to federal court review while 
balancing separation of powers concerns—albeit in cases in which plaintiffs 
with clear standing as taxpayers subject to liability seek to challenge IRS 
revenue rules.222  This balance of federal powers appropriately recognizes a 
limited role for federal courts in ensuring government accountability 
through oversight of agency rulemaking, as well as the need for agency 
flexibility and discretion in carrying out statutorily delegated duties.223  By 
contrast, restrictive standing doctrine rests on dubious and increasingly 
rejected tax exceptions to the general rule supporting limited judicial review 
of federal agency action.  Expanding judicial review for regulatory 
stakeholders challenging federal government agency action would promote, 
rather than disrupt, separation of powers by recognizing substantial agency 
discretion in the implementation of legislative mandates while preventing 
federal agencies from insulating themselves entirely from judicial 
oversight.224 
B. Balancing Judicial Review and Deference to Agency Decisionmaking 
1. Finality of Agency Action and Non-Action 
Agency action is presumptively subject to judicial review.225  
Nevertheless, the APA restricts judicial review to “final” agency action and 
precludes review entirely where “statutes preclude judicial review” or 
“agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”226  Agency “non-
 
procedural challenge to final agency action).  
 222. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713; Cohen, 650 F.3d at 726 (rejecting the IRS view of “a world 
in which no challenge to its actions is ever outside the closed loop of its taxing authority”). 
 223. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012). 
 224. Brown, supra note 183, at 729 (noting “highly deferential standards of review” on 
the merits address separation of powers concerns animating restrictive standing doctrine); 
Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 311 (2011) 
(describing Chevron as “a doctrine of judicial self-restraint under the courts’ Article III 
responsibilities”); see also Richard Murphy, Abandoning Standing: Trading a Rule of Access for a 
Rule of Deference, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 943, 949 (2008) (“[A] rule of judicial deference . . . could 
provide a better means for ensuring proper separation of judicial and political powers than 
constitutional standing’s contentious, injury-based limits on judicial access.”).  
 225. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) 
(presumption may be rebutted); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) 
(“[J]udicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless 
there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.”). 
 226. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 704; see Abbott Labs, 387 U.S. at 148 (stating that the judicial 
doctrine of ripeness also limits premature review of challenges to agency actions); see also 
IRC § 7421(a) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). 
2-lu (Do Not Delete)3/30/2014 8:58 AM 
2014] STANDING IN THE SHADOW OF TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 119 
action” is, in theory, also reviewable;227 under principles supporting 
unfettered prosecutorial discretion, agency declinations of enforcement 
action are ordinarily not reviewable,228 but agency decisions to forego 
issuance of rules in implementing a regulatory scheme remain subject to 
judicial oversight.229  Nonetheless, federal courts have declined to exercise 
their authority to “compel agency action [unless it has been] unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed.”230  Courts thus defer to agency 
decisions regarding the allocation of their own resources based on different 
rulemaking priorities.231 
Such restrictions on reviewability reflect concerns that litigants will usurp 
federal courts to engage in “a kind of private conscription of public 
resources . . . that undermines a fully democratic effort . . . to allocate . . . 
limited [agency] resources to the most serious problems.”232  Such concerns 
regarding private citizens’ ability to steer agency enforcement priorities are 
familiar.  Still, agency decisions to forego issuance of rules or guidance of 
any kind may amount to an abdication of statutory obligations warranting 
judicial review.233 
Even where an agency has affirmatively issued rules implementing 
statutory mandates, it may employ rulemaking procedures that involve little 
public participation or oversight.  The IRS establishes numerous rules 
governing tax-exempt public charities, but much of its guidance exists in 
the form of revenue rulings and revenue procedures issued without public 
notice-and-comment procedures under the APA’s statutory exception for 
 
 227. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. 
 228. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (concluding that “an agency’s 
decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review” 
as “‘committed to agency discretion’” under § 701(a)(2)).   
 229. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (recognizing that while 
agencies have broad discretion in deciding how to allocate resources, “[r]efusals to 
promulgate rules are . . . susceptible to judicial review”); cf. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness 
Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64–65 (2004) (limiting judicial review to “agency fail[ure] to take 
a discrete agency action that it is required to take”).  But see Bressman, supra note 13, at 1709 
(noting that “specific failures to enforce” require more scrutiny than rulemaking to guard 
against arbitrariness than failures to “comply . . . with broad congressional directives” or 
attempts to “compel agencies to reduce general statutory standards to specific prohibitions 
or requirements”). 
 230. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 
 231. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 62–66 (deferring to agency resource allocation decision 
where agency had no clear statutory mandate).  
 232. Sunstein, supra note 61, at 631 (footnote omitted). 
 233. See Monte A. Jackel, Is There Anything Wrong with the Guidance Process?, 132 TAX 
NOTES 935, 936 (2011) (documenting the problem of retroactive, unsupportable, and 
politically motivated tax guidance).  
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“interpretive” rules.234  The plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky conceded before the 
D.C. Circuit that the revenue ruling they challenged “ha[d] no 
independent binding effect,” which rendered it unreviewable as a final 
agency action or, as Justice Brennan argued in his concurrence in the 
judgment, unripe.235  Without judicial scrutiny, the IRS’s designation of 
rules as “interpretive”—and therefore exempt from public notice-and-
comment requirements—could insulate entire regulatory schemes from 
judicial review.236 
Recently, however, in Cohen v. United States, the D.C. Circuit held an IRS 
“notice” issued without public notice-and-comment procedures to be a 
“final agency action” reviewable under the APA after determining that the 
notice altered legal rights and was intended to be binding.237  The court 
found that a notice outlining allegedly inadequate procedures for taxpayers 
seeking a refund of excise taxes (which the agency conceded were 
unlawfully collected) represented “the consummation” of agency 
decisionmaking and had binding legal consequences.238  Notably, public 
charities may also be subject to legal consequences—including denial or 
revocation of agency recognition of tax-exempt status—for noncompliance 
with revenue rules issued without public notice-and-comment procedures, 
such as the revenue ruling and revenue procedures at issue in Eastern 
Kentucky and Wright.239  By confirming in Cohen the finality and therefore the 
reviewability of a potentially broad range of informal agency guidances not 
rising to the level of a notice-and-comment regulation, the D.C. Circuit 
refused to permit the IRS to insulate itself against judicial scrutiny through 
its characterization of such rules as “interpretive” and exempt from the 
APA’s notice-and-comment procedures.240  In doing so, the court 
 
 234. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). 
 235. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see 
Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 73 (1965) (informal guidance lacks the “force of law”).  
 236. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1383, 1412, 1446 (2004) (identifying concern “that the agency will be allowed to act 
‘strategically’ in choosing its policymaking form”). 
 237. Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1, 6–12 (D.C. Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted in 
part, opinion vacated in part, 599 F.3d 652 (D.C. Cir. 2010), on reh’g en banc rev’d in part, 650 F.3d 
717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc), and remanded to In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise 
Tax Refund Litig., 853 F. Supp. 2d 138, 142–43 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding on remand that a 
legally binding IRS Notice required notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
 238. Cohen, 578 F.3d at 6. 
 239. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding 
revocation of tax-exempt status pursuant to revenue ruling); Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United 
States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (reversing rejection of tax-exempt status pursuant to 
unconstitutionally vague revenue procedure). 
 240. Cohen, 578 F.3d at 8, 12.  
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confirmed the applicability of the general presumption of judicial review for 
a broad range of tax administration rules.241  Reviewability doctrine thus 
assuages separation of powers concerns by subjecting legally binding agency 
implementation of statutory mandates to judicial scrutiny except in 
circumstances in which Congress has left discrete resource allocation and 
rulemaking priorities to agency discretion.  A similar accommodation 
occurs in judicial review of agency decisionmaking on the merits. 
2. Delegation and Deference to Agency Interpretations of Statutory Mandates 
Courts exercising judicial review of agency action play a crucial role in 
“ensuring that agencies have engaged in reasoned decisionmaking” by 
determining “whether [a] decision was based on a consideration of the 
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.”242  
Judicial oversight of government action is particularly important where it is 
carried out not by politically accountable elected representatives but by 
unelected appointees of the executive.243  Accordingly, under Chevron and 
related doctrines,244 courts reviewing the validity of agency rules must take 
into account the intent of Congress to cede power through the enactment of 
ambiguous statutes, thereby delegating regulatory authority—and 
discretion—to agencies to fill in the gaps by promulgating rules that have 
“the force of law.”245  Where Congress so acts, courts must accord 
deference to agency rules so long as those rules reasonably interpret 
statutory mandates; such deference recognizes an agency’s comparatively 
expert judgment in the regulatory matters entrusted to it by Congress.246 
 
 241. See Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 
90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 394 (2011) (advocating “mak[ing] guidance documents substantively 
reviewable when they are issued” to “encourage agencies to solicit input even from 
stakeholders outside the issue networks affected”). 
 242. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 484 (2011) (quoting  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n 
of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 243. See Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in 
Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2032 (2011) (discussing constitutional 
claims against agency actors).  
 244. See generally Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000); Connor N. Raso & 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What 
Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727 (2010) (characterizing 
Chevron as a canon of statutory interpretation).  
 245. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1984). 
 246. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 517 (2011) (observing that deference 
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As Professor Biber observes, limits on justiciability—including 
restrictions on when agency action or inaction becomes reviewable and on 
which regulatory stakeholders have standing to seek review—effectively 
operate as a form of absolute deference to agency decisionmaking.247  
Judicial review of agency rules on the merits, then, even under highly 
deferential standards, better promotes the separation of powers by 
permitting judicial oversight, however limited, of rulemaking by agency 
officials otherwise not directly accountable to the public. 
In Mayo, a unanimous Supreme Court stated: “We see no reason why 
our review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency expertise 
pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review of other 
regulations.”248  Accordingly, courts reviewing revenue rules must engage 
in the same inquiry—no less complicated for being familiar—into the 
degree to which Congress intended an IRS rule implementing a statutory 
mandate itself to “carry the force of law,”249 and consequently, the degree 
of deference to which the agency’s interpretation is entitled.250 
To the extent Congress duly delegates the implementation of tax-code 
mandates fully to the IRS, agency rules exercising that authority with “the 
force of law” are entitled to strong deference by the courts.251  By contrast, 
 
may be warranted in light of the “expertise-based comparative institutional advantage” of 
agencies, and “the goal of maximizing national uniformity in implementing national 
statutes”). 
 247. See Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action 
and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461 (2008). 
 248. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 
(2011).  
 249. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 221; Hickman, supra note 67, at 255, 264–65; see also 
Marie Sapirie, DOJ Won’t Push Chevron Deference for Revenue Rulings, 131 TAX NOTES 674 
(2011) (reporting that the Department of Justice will not seek Chevron deference unless tax 
rules have undergone notice-and-comment rulemaking).  
 250. Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 711 (“[W]e may not disturb an agency rule unless it is 
arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to statute.” (quoting Household 
Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226–27. 
 251. The question whether such informal guidance documents may have the “force of 
law” for purposes of Chevron deference without also being “legally binding” for purposes of 
triggering notice-and-comment rulemaking remains unsettled.  Professor Hickman points 
out that taxpayers may be subject to penalty for noncompliance with informal guidance as 
much as with notice-and-comment regulations, strongly suggesting that informal guidance 
must undergo such rulemaking procedures.  See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of 
Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 529 (2013) (concluding that informal IRS guidance documents 
“carry the force and effect of law, are legislative rules necessitating APA notice and 
comment (and are invalid to the extent that they lack those procedures),” and warrant 
Chevron deference). 
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where—as in the public charities context—the IRS chooses to regulate 
largely through guidances, including revenue rulings, revenue procedures, 
Notices, private letter rulings, and technical-advice memoranda that may 
not carry “the force of law,”252 such rules may be entitled to deference only 
to the extent that they demonstrate the “power to persuade” based on 
factors announced in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.253  Among these factors are “the 
thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its 
 
 252. Since many revenue policies applicable to public charities interpret one of the 
agency’s own regulations, Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1, they may arguably be entitled to 
nearly absolute deference under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).  However, to the 
extent the regulation merely parrots the statutory language in IRC § 501(c)(3), such absolute 
deference may be unwarranted.  See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Kevin M. 
Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 363 (2012) (advocating a “purposive 
approach” that determines “whether the interpretation is (1) permitted by the regulation’s 
text and (2) consistent with the regulation’s purposes, as set forth in the statement of basis 
and purpose and the regulation’s text”). 
 253. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S 218, 228, 
235 (2001) (evaluating “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and 
relative expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency’s position”; “thoroughness, 
logic, and expertness, and] its fit with prior interpretations”).  In National Muffler Dealers 
Association v. United States, the Court 
determin[ed] whether a particular regulation carrie[d] out the congressional mandate 
in a proper manner . . . [by assessing] whether [a] regulation harmonizes with the 
plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose[;] . . .  [whether] it is a 
substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to have 
been aware of congressional intent[;] . . .  the manner in which [the regulation] 
evolved[;] . . .  the length of time the regulation has been in effect[;] the reliance 
placed on it[;] the consistency of the Commissioner’s interpretation[;] and the degree 
of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments 
of the statute. 
440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (citations omitted). 
It is unclear the extent to which Skidmore differs from the alternate standard of National 
Muffler (and, indeed, how much Skidmore varies from Chevron).  See Kristin E. Hickman & 
Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 
1241–42 (2007) (arguing that despite some differences, courts will likely look to legislative 
purpose and harmony under any standard); Andrew Pruitt, Judicial Deference to Retroactive 
Interpretative Treasury Regulations, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1558, 1562 (2011) (favoring National 
Muffler for retroactive tax regulations that have undergone notice-and-comment 
rulemaking).  But see David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 525, 527, 560 
(2011) (finding that courts rule in favor of agency interpretation in approximately 70% of 
cases and will “ultimately embrace a reasonableness standard of review and reject the 
complexity of the current set of standards”).  Professor Hickman and Matthew D. Krueger 
argue that courts reviewing agency rules should apply varying degrees of strong, weak, or 
intermediate “deference that [are] tailored in accordance to contextual factors,” with 
“agency expertise and the avoidance of arbitrariness” operating as the “guiding principles” 
for the inquiry.  Hickman & Krueger, supra, at 1309–10.  
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reasoning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.”254 
Under Skidmore, courts may weigh a variety of factors; in practice, courts 
may differ in the relative weight they assign to each factor.  For example, 
courts may “credit” agency interpretations “that are likely to be politically 
neutral, that may have lasted through a number of political changes.”255  
This level of judicial inquiry, Professor Strauss contends, “respects the 
complex relationship amongst the legislature, executive, and judiciary.”256  
At the same time, respect for agency expertise often requires recognition 
that even longstanding policies are subject to change for valid reasons.257  
Ultimately, in determining the range of permissible interpretations, 
“Among the matters indispensable for [a court] to consider . . . are the 
meanings attributed to [the statute] by prior (administrative) interpreters, 
their stability, and the possibly superior body of information” available to 
agency experts tasked with implementing a regulatory scheme.258 
By raising such factors in the context of tax administration—even as they 
predated the modern Chevron framework—Eastern Kentucky and Wright 
presented familiar rulemaking challenges fully within the federal courts’ 
competence and scope of authority.  Before the Supreme Court denied 
standing in Eastern Kentucky, the lower courts considering the merits 
disagreed on the validity of the IRS policy rescinding the hospital charity-
care requirement; each, however, gave heavy weight to legislative hints 
regarding the agency’s change in tax-exemption policy.259  After the district 
 
 254. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see also Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218.   
 255. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and 
“Skidmore Weight”, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1147 (2012).  But see Judulang v. Holder, 132 
S. Ct. 476, 488 (2011) (“Arbitrary agency action becomes no less so by simple dint of 
repetition. . . .  And longstanding capriciousness receives no special exemption from the 
APA.”). 
 256. Strauss, supra note 255, at 1147. 
 257. Some federal circuits require changes in agency interpretations to be made through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.  See, e.g., Ala. Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 
1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“When an agency has given its regulation a definitive interpretation, 
and later significantly revises that interpretation, the agency has in effect amended its rule, 
something it may not accomplish without notice and comment.”). 
 258. Strauss, supra note 255, at 1156; see also Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, 
Agency Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1017 (2005) (recognizing “the 
force of law”—and justification for deference—where agency interpretation is longstanding 
or was reached after a rulemaking process evincing agency investment in and commitment 
to the resulting interpretation). 
 259. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 336 (D.D.C. 1973).  The 
Court cited Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Comm’r, 383 U.S. 272 (1966), decided a few years before 
National Muffler, where, “[i]n reaching its determination, cognizance was taken and great 
weight was given to the fact that for many years the IRS had followed a fundamentally 
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court in Eastern Kentucky “focus[ed] upon and [gave] careful consideration to 
the relevant judicial, legislative and administrative history” of Revenue 
Ruling 69-545, it found the IRS’s reversal of policy to be illegitimate given 
the consistent practice of courts and the agency in requiring tax-exempt 
hospitals to provide charity care.260  In addition, the district court gave 
significant weight to the fact that Congress had indicated in conference 
reports that relief to the poor was a minimum requirement for exempt 
hospitals.261  However, the D.C. Circuit reversed on the basis that the 
congressional materials were equivocal; at least one House Report stated 
that the legal definition of “charitable” should control instead of the 
popular connotation requiring relief to the poor.262  In addition, in light of 
“the changed health care situation in the country as a result of Medicare, 
Medicaid and other government programs, of which the [IRS] was 
cognizant,” the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in the 
elimination of the charity-care requirement.263 
In Wright, the D.C. Circuit remanded for consideration on the merits 
after reversing the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing.264  When 
the suit was again dismissed by the Supreme Court, the federal courts lost 
the opportunity to decide whether the Constitution or the IRC required 
more than mere adoption and certification of a nonracially discriminatory 
policy by private, tax-exempt schools—or whether Chevron, decided in the 
same term, required any particular level of deference to the IRS’s current 
rule.  Still, the Court had just decided Bob Jones in the previous term;265 
there, the Court read a public policy limitation developed in the common 
law of charitable trusts into § 501(c)(3), to find racial discrimination in 
private schools to violate “fundamental national public policy” as 
announced by each of the three federal branches.266  The Court further 
noted that the agency, for its part, was authorized to identify such policy 
based on its expertise: “In an area as complex as the tax system, the agency 
Congress vests with administrative responsibility must be able to exercise its 
 
different policy which had been solidified by court as well as congressional approval.”  E. 
Ky., 370 F. Supp. at 336. 
 260. Id. at 325, 336 (footnote omitted). 
 261. Id. at 332. 
 262. See Valentine, supra note 54, at 1005–06. 
 263. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  
 264. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d. 820, 837–38 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  The court also rejected 
the district court’s conclusion that Congress had effectively precluded review by 
prospectively defunding future agency enforcement of the policies plaintiffs sought.  
 265. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983). 
 266. Id. at 593. 
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authority to meet changing conditions and new problems.”267  The Court 
later cited this language to support its application of Chevron deference to tax 
regulations in Mayo.268  Without explicitly deferring to either agency 
delegation or discretion, then, the Bob Jones decision rested in part on 
factors indicating both the exercise of agency expertise in implementing 
evolving norms and legislative intent or, more particularly, legislative 
acquiescence validating the IRS’s nondiscrimination policy.269 
Agency interpretations of statutes arising in the tax—or tax-exempt 
public charities—context are just as likely as in other administrative 
contexts to trigger what Professor Eskridge and Lauren E. Baer describe as 
judicial “deploy[ment of] ongoing legislative history to support statutory 
interpretations.”270  Such efforts have arisen “in cases where the Court was 
assimilating agency understandings of statutes that had generated ongoing 
exchanges between the agency and Congress.”271  While federal courts may 
seek to avoid wading into such exchanges—and the Supreme Court 
vigorously resisted doing so in Wright—their oversight role may be most 
warranted in such situations, where both agency and legislature decline to 
employ more publicly accountable means for fixing the meaning of revenue 
rules, such as legislative amendment or notice-and-comment rulemaking.272  
Whether justified as a matter of statutory construction or through scrutiny 
of factors demonstrating the persuasiveness or reasonableness of the 
 
 267. Id. at 596. 
 268. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714 
(2011).  
 269. See Sugin, supra note 19, at 444 (“Commentators have argued that because of its 
special nature, the tax law lends itself to a different method of interpretation than other 
statutes; the Code’s internal logic and coherence may be more important than the original 
intent of Congress in the day-to-day interpretation of tax statutes.”) (footnote omitted).  This 
view “treats tax policy as dependent only upon the internal structure and coherence of the 
tax law.”  Id. at 474. 
 270. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1197 
(2008). 
 271. Id. Prior to Mayo, Professor Eskridge described Bob Jones as “following” the IRS’s 
interpretation of the IRC “based upon congressional acquiescence in [a] controversial 
agency interpretation.”  Id. at 1197 n.368. 
 272. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 
(1989) (discussing statutory interpretation as construing legislation to protect historically 
marginalized groups); Andre L. Smith, Race, Law, and the Free Market: A Critical Law and 
Economics Conception of Racism as Asymmetrical Market Failure, 4 GEO J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL 
RACE PERSP. 39, 41, 50 (2012) (arguing that under Bob Jones, “Congress expects judges to 
consider the effect statutes have on racial equality” and “did not intend for tax exemption to 
support or worsen racial subordination”). 
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agency’s own decisionmaking process and rationale, such judicial 
determinations adequately accommodate federal courts’ obligation to 
enforce congressional mandates and delegations to agencies without wholly 
insulating agency action from judicial review. 
Importantly, such analysis does not require an exception from general 
administrative law principles governing judicial review of agency action on 
the merits.  To the contrary, federal courts are particularly well-equipped to 
balance the risks of arbitrary decisionmaking against agency expertise 
deserving of deference in tax as in other contexts.273  After Mayo, courts 
have no reason to exempt tax administration from general administrative 
law principles.  With Chevron deference fully available in the tax 
administration context, revenue rules with the force of law merit judicial 
deference except where wholly unreasonable or contrary to a clear 
statutory command.  Even rules that are subject to a more searching 
inquiry permitting courts to assess factors evincing legislative intent, the 
thoroughness of agency deliberations, and the interactions between the two 
may pass muster where agency decisionmaking processes and outcomes 
comport generally with legislative design.  While more searching review of 
the substantive legitimacy of agency rules may not necessarily result in a 
different outcome,274 at a minimum, the process of judicial review of IRS 
rules on the merits within the Chevron/Skidmore framework extends general 
principles applicable in other regulatory contexts—due respect for agency 
expertise balanced against the need to guard against the risk of arbitrary 
agency action275—to the context of tax administration. 
Because tax rules, like other forms of regulation, may affect the 
individualized, concrete interests of stakeholders who are not themselves 
regulated entities, the same principles support expanded standing for such 
regulatory stakeholders to challenge substantive federal agency rules.  
While Eastern Kentucky and Wright limited standing for such plaintiffs, both 
cases rest on flawed analysis of the regulatory tax-exemption scheme that 
reflects an eroding tax-exceptionalist perspective.  Recent developments 
 
 273. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 253, at 1309–10 (advocating for balance 
between policing arbitrariness and deferring to agency expertise). 
 274. More searching review may not even result in appreciably higher rates of litigation.  
See Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries?, 
23 J. CORP. L. 655, 693 (1998) (finding that collective-action problems will prevent a flood of 
litigation, as most will prefer to be free riders on others’ litigation efforts); Brown, supra note 
183, at 729 (rejecting concerns about flood of litigation). 
 275. See Brown, supra note 183 (advocating context-sensitive inquiry); see also Pruitt, supra 
note 253 (suggesting regulations promulgated under notice-and-comment rulemaking may 
even warrant more scrutiny where such rules have retroactive effect). 
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confirming the application of general administrative law principles in the 
tax context further destabilize the already shaky foundation for such a 
restrictive standing doctrine.  As in other administrative contexts, the 
presumption of reviewability of federal agency action and deference to 
agency discretion on the merits respects rather than offends the separation 
of powers.  In the revenue context, as elsewhere, broader standing for 
regulatory stakeholders to seek judicial review of harmful agency action 
would promote rather than frustrate the appropriate balance of federal 
powers and reasoned agency rulemaking. 
CONCLUSION 
The IRS wields tremendous power and potential to oversee the provision 
of diverse public benefits by vital social institutions through regulation of 
tax-exempt public charities under the IRC.  Like other administrative 
agencies that must take into account the interests of a variety of 
stakeholders, the IRS faces the challenge of balancing sector autonomy and 
pluralism against a clear obligation to limit tax exemption for public 
charities to statutorily authorized entities.  In carrying out its statutory 
mandate, the IRS—again, like other agencies tasked with regulating social 
and economic behavior—necessarily gives effect to public values protected 
by the exemption scheme according to legislative design and constitutional 
commands. 
As one of the most visible contexts in which tax rules regulate behavior 
with consequences for a broad range of other stakeholders, tax exemption 
for public charities naturally invited attempts at judicial oversight in Eastern 
Kentucky and Wright.  Yet the Court’s tax-exceptionalist focus on revenue 
collection and, relatedly, on individual agency actions to enforce taxpayer 
compliance, effectively insulated the agency from general administrative 
law principles supporting judicial review.  Instead of crediting the influence 
of agency rules on a wide range of stakeholders and acknowledging the 
agency’s role in setting such broadly applicable rules, the Court resorted to 
general prudential and constitutional grounds to limit standing by 
regulatory outsiders to challenge and influence agency decisionmaking. 
In contrast to the Court’s tax-exceptionalist view, IRS administration of 
revenue rules operates as a form of regulation that raises or lowers the 
costs—both economic and intangible—of public charities’ activities to 
ensure a benefit to the public.  Accordingly, neither prudential concerns 
about regulatory stakeholders as outsiders to the tax regulatory relationship 
nor broad separation of powers concerns regarding judicial oversight of 
government agency action justify limitations on standing for regulatory 
stakeholders in tax or other administrative arenas.  Rather, as increasingly 
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recognized by federal courts, general administrative law principles apply in 
the revenue context, as in other contexts, to cabin court intervention in 
executive affairs by respecting agency expertise and flexibility while also 
ensuring government accountability by guarding against arbitrary agency 
decisionmaking. 
Contemporary commentators give short shrift to judicial review 
instigated by regulatory stakeholders as a viable—or even desirable—
option for overseeing IRS implementation of tax exemption for public 
charities.276  Some conclude that the discretion of expert agency 
decisionmakers or voluntary self-regulation by public charities suffices to 
protect the interests of those affected by regulation of exempt entities.277  
To the contrary, under well-established principles that apply as much in the 
tax context as in other regulatory frameworks, both regulated entities and 
other regulatory stakeholders warrant access to federal court to challenge 
agency decisions that adversely impact their interests—whether by 
imposing regulatory burdens or by frustrating the intended protections and 
benefits of regulatory schemes.  In particular, where the stakeholders 
seeking to enforce regulatory mandates are historically marginalized, 
economically disadvantaged, or otherwise politically disempowered, access 
to federal court may be an essential form of leverage through which to 
influence agency decisionmaking.  By denying standing to such stakeholders 
despite their constitutionally sufficient injuries in Eastern Kentucky and Wright, 
the Supreme Court weakened a crucial check on agency discretion as well 
as agency capture by regulated entities routinely entitled to seek judicial 
review of regulatory burdens. 
As in other administrative contexts, judicial review by a broad range of 
stakeholders of public charities exemptions remains an essential but missing 
component of private citizen oversight of IRS administration.278  Such 
 
 276. See Kevin A. Coyle, Comment, Standing of Third Parties to Challenge Administrative Agency 
Actions, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1061 (1988); see generally Atkinson, supra note 274, at 684–85 n.146. 
 277. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, How Public is Private Philanthropy? Separating 
Reality from Myth (2d ed. 2012), available at http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/ 
guidebook/how_public_is_private_philanthropy_2nd_edition/philanthropic_freedom/; 
Galle, supra note 41;  Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the 
Twenty-First Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479 (2010); 
Rodrigues, supra note 42, at 1264–65 (observing that nonprofit form constrains public 
charities through formation of a social identity that enables them to execute their mission in 
a way that for-profit entities cannot); Marcus S. Owens, Charity Oversight: An Alternative 
Approach (Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 33.4, 2006) 
(positing self-regulatory framework for nonprofit entities akin to a securities exchange).  
 278. See, e.g., Coplan, supra note 10 (exploring the Petition Clause as basis for 
organizational standing in the environmental context).  
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stakeholders warrant their own route to federal court oversight of 
government agency action that operates to their detriment.  By exposing 
standing doctrine as implicitly based on an eroding tax-exceptionalist 
foundation, this Article seeks to reinvigorate the discussion of how to 
correct the imbalance in judicial access and agency influence for 
stakeholders of federal public charities regulation, as well as other 
regulatory arenas.  At a minimum, such a debate remains especially vital if 
historically subordinated and politically marginalized populations are to 
count as part of the “public” for whose benefit tax-exempt public charities 
exist. 
 
 
